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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), an exception to the rule 
against admission of hearsay, permits introduction of public re-
cords or reports containing the fact findings of the reporter without 
requiring the reporter to appear at trial. 1 These fact findings can 
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I. Rule 803(8) provides a hearsay exception for: 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices 
or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty 
to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and 
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
FED. R. Evro. 803(8). 
An exception was recognized under the common law "for written records and reports 
of public officials under a duty to make them, made upon firsthand knowledge of the 
facts." McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 888 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter McCORMICK) 
(footnotes omitted). Before adoption of the federal rules, admissibility of public reports in 
the federal courts was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a), which provides: "Books or records 
of account or minutes of proceedings of any department or agency of the United States 
shall be admissible to prove the act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of which 
the same were made or kept." Rule 803(8), which was modeled after Uniform Rule of 
Evidence 63(15), expanded the existing statute by allowing admission of the report of any 
public agency, not just those of federal agencies. Sections A and B of the rule "found 
ample support in previous law .... " See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 
, 803(8)(01), at 803-235 (1988). It is section C, allowing admission of investigative reports, 
which constitutes a significant expansion of the exception and has created the most 
controversy and difficulty in interpretation. See Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 
445-46 (1988); McCORMICK SUPRA, at 890. 
Rule 803(8)(C) does not allow the use of investigative reports by the government in 
criminal cases. This restriction was inserted to avoid "the almost certain collision with 
confrontation rights which would result." FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. 
This Article, therefore, focuses on the use of such evidence in civil proceedings only. 
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be based upon the reporter's own observations and calculations2 
or information imparted to the reporter from sources having no 
connection to any public agency whatsoever. 3 Rule 803(8)(C) has 
also been used as the vehicle for presenting juries with fact findings 
from hearings conducted by public officials. 4 The rule would seem 
to allow these fact findings even though the opponent had no 
opportunity to challenge either the finding or any of the witnesses 
whose testimony led to it. 5 This Article contends that admitting 
2. Such observations and calculations would also be covered under Rule 803(8)(8) 
which allows for the admission of: 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices 
or agencies, setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law 
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal 
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement person-
nel .... 
FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(8). 
3. Cases that have admitted public records or reports including fact findings based 
in whole or in part on the information supplied by nongovernment sources under Rule 
803(8)(C) include: Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 617-20 (8th Cir. 
1983) (victims of toxic shock syndrome); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 
F.2d 238, 263-75 (3d Cir. 1983) (manufacturers), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 
U.S. 1029 (1987); Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 50-52 (1st Cir.) (automobile manufac-
turers and others regarding the stopping distance of vehicles), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 
(1981); Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 556-59 (6th Cir. 1978) (eyewitness to 
automobile accident), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Diaz v. United States, 655 F. 
Supp. 411, 416 (E.D. Va. 1987) (witnesses to accident on ship); Sage v. Rockwell Int'l 
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1205, 1206-07 (D.N.H. 1979) (eyewitnesses to air crash). 
4. Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (lOth Cir. 1986); see In re Paducah 
Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 419-21 (6th Cir. 1982); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 
F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. School 
Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 
1980); William v. Housing Auth. of Sanford, 709 F. Supp. 1554, 1562 (M.D. Fla. 1988), 
aff'd without opinion, 872 F.2d 434 (lith Cir. 1989); In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 Bankr. 
373, 375-77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. 
Supp. 353, 363-65 (D.D.C. 1980). 
Although one of the factors listed by the advisory committee for determining admissibility 
of evaluative reports is "whether a hearing was held," courts have generally ignored this 
as either a positive or negative factor. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note; 
see infra note 55 and accompanying text. On the one hand, courts have held that lack of 
a hearing does not preclude admissibility. See Baker, 588 F.2d at 558. American Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. at 365. On the other hand, courts have rejected arguments that 
quasi-judicial hearing results are not the results of an "investigation" and are therefore 
not admissible under Rule 803(8)(C). See Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 
F.2d 785, 818 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); School Dist. of Ferndale, 
577 F.2d at 1354; Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prod. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985), rev'd, 803 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986). 
5. See Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1046-47. Fact findings reached following hearings with 
limited procedural protections have also been allowed in under Rule 803(8)(C). Paducah 
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many of the fact findings discussed above without demonstrable 
need or strong assurances of their reliability undercuts the bases 
for the hearsay rules6 and can result in jury consideration of highly 
prejudicial evidence. 7 
Towing Co., 692 F.2d at 419-21 (improperly curtailed examination of key witness and 
unreliable source testimony upon which it was based led to conclusion of the administrative 
law judge ("ALJ") which was "striking" in its similarity to unreliable key witness, yet 
deemed admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)); In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 Bankr. at 377 
(key witness had no counsel or opportunity to cross-examine); American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
498 F. Supp. at 365-66 ("paper hearing"). 
Reports compiled by government officials that are essentially investigative in nature, such 
as accident reports or evaluative reports that analyze existing data or collate research into 
such matters as the danger of a new product, are customarily completed without a hearing 
and accordingly without the ability to challenge the resulting fact findings. When the fact 
finding determined after a hearing is introduced during a trial the party opposing the fact 
finding is prejudiced, often significantly more than the opponent of the above described 
reports. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Therefore, before admitting such a 
fact finding at trial, courts should be particularly scrupulous in ensuring that the opponent 
of the fact finding has had adequate opportunity to challenge it at the hearing. 
6. Information supplied by third-party sources that finds its way into government 
reports and fact findings based upon such third-party sources should be inadmissible at 
trial unless such statements "possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient 
to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial." FED. R. Evm. 803 
advisory committee's note; see also FED. R. Evm. 805. The guarantee of trustworthiness 
for public records is the assumption that the public official will "perform his duty properly." 
FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note. This duty has been interpreted to include 
"the duty to make an accurate report .... " McCORMICK supra note I, § 315 at 889. 
It is one thing to presume a public official has made his report accurately because of 
the nature of his position; it is quite another, however, for courts to rely upon the fact 
findings of public officials when those findings are based upon information supplied by 
third-party sources. This gap is bridged by the further assumption that public officials 
"will be careful and discriminating in selecting the factual data upon which to rely in 
reaching their findings." LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 7.19 (2d 
ed. 1987). The presumption that a reporter, because he is a public official, can accurately 
distinguish the credibility of various informants upon whom his fact findings are based (to 
dispense with the need for the jury to hear from either the reporter or his informants) is 
dubious. See the discussion of differences between Rules 803(8)(C) and 803(6) infra note 
15. 
7. For cases admitting reports containing highly prejudicial fact findings based in 
part or in whole upon third-party sources, see Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1046-47 (police officer 
acted in accordance with department policies with respect to firing his weapon); Paducah 
Towing Co., 692 F.2d at 421 (ALl's findings relating to reasonableness of ship captain's 
actions); Baker, 588 F.2d at 555 ("apparently unit #2 entered the intersection against a red 
light"); School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1354-55 (hearing examiner's finding that 
school district had segregated schools); In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 Bankr. at 375-77 
(State Ethics Commission finding regarding misappropriation of funds); Theobald v. Botein, 
493 F. Supp. I, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (State Division of Human Rights finding that there was 
no probable cause to believe that defendant had discriminated in firing plaintiff-employee); 
Sage, 477 F. Supp. at 1206-10 (evaluative reports regarding the circumstances behind and 
causes of air crash); Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1265-67 (S.D. 
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In Beech Aircraft Corporation v. Rainey,8 the Supreme Court 
interpreted the "factual findings" provision of 803(8)(C) broadly 
to include "conclusions" and "opinions" of the investigator.9 
While the decision in Beech Aircraft is sensible in its recognition 
of the difficulty in distinguishing "factual findings" from "opi-
nions" and "conclusions," 10 it will result in an expansion of the 
type of hearsay-based evidence that will be admitted under Rule 
803(8)(C). 11 Where a hearsay exception expands both the allowable 
sources of hearsay information and the type of hearsay-based 
evidence admitted, extreme care should be taken to ensure that 
questionably reliable or prejudicial evidence is not submitted to a 
jury without the opportunity to test the evidence through cross-
examination. Rule 803(8)(C) was not drafted nor has it been 
generally applied with such caution. 
First, this Article explores some of the problems encountered by 
courts in applying Rule 803(8)(C) and explains some of the un-
fairness that can result if it is not applied carefully. Second, it 
describes the Supreme Court's Beech Aircraft decision allowing 
opinions and conclusions into evidence under Rule 803(8)(C). 
Third, the Article describes a suggested reading of Rule 803(8)(C) 
in conjunction with the rules on expert witnesses that should help 
Ohio 1979) (causes of air crash); see also Hess v. Arbogast, 376 S.E.2d 333, 338-40 (W. 
Va. 1988) (applying state statute identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) to allow 
finding of county commissioner that testator was incompetent to manage his funds eight 
days before he signed his will). 
8. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988). 
9. !d. at 445-50. For a full discussion of the reasoning of Beech Aircraft, see text 
accompanying infra notes 101-18. 
10. Although the House and Senate were divided on this issue at the time of passage 
of the Federal Rules, see infra note Ill, most courts and commentators had taken the 
broader view adopted by the Supreme Court. See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 
720, 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1046-47; Ellis 
v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 300-04 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble 
Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618-20 (8th Cir. 1983); Baker, 588 F.2d at 558-59; Melville v. 
American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3d Cir. 1978); J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, supra note I 1 803(8)[03]; McCoRMICK, supra note I, at 890-91 n.7; Grant, The 
Trustworthiness Standard for Public Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 W. ST. 
U. L. REv. 53, 85 (1984); Note, The Scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 59 TEX. 
L. REv. 155, 157-59 (1980). But see Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 220-23 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
II. Taking the example of a police accident report, if the narrow view had been 
accepted, only specific findings of fact (for example, the speed of the automobiles and the 
point of impact) could have been admitted. Under the broad approach adopted by the 
Court, the investigator's conclusions regarding who was at fault in the accident might also 
be admitted. Not only will more findings be admissible under this standard, but because 
the investigator's conclusions often approach the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, 
their admission will have a greater impact on the jury and a greater possibility of prejudice. 
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courts determine which opinions and conclusions should be ad-
missible. Finally, the Article offers additional suggestions to insure 
the fair application of Rule 803(8)(C). 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH RULE 803(8)(C) 
Rule 803(8)(C) has the capacity to expand significantly the 
amount and manner of hearsay and hearsay-based conclusions 
made available to juries in civil cases. Under Rule 803(8)(C), 
reports or records of public officials are admissible without the 
presence of the reporting officer, even though the reports contain 
hearsay and conclusions based upon hearsay. 
A. Lack of Cross-Examination 
The first danger posed by Rule 803(8)(C) is the use of a fact 
finding in a public report without an opportunity for the opponent 
to cross-examine the reporter to determine the basis for the finding. 
One justification for the use of such fact findings is that public 
officials are objective and sufficiently responsible to include fact 
findings in their reports only if based on reliable information. 12 In 
our adversary system, however, this assertion should be tested. 
For example, it is reasonable to expect that jurors could more 
effectively assess the reliability of a fact finding if they knew the 
background, training, and experience of the fact finder .13 Such 
information is unlikely to appear in a public report and would 
certainly not be revealed to the extent that it could be through 
cross-examination. Juries are likely to benefit even more from 
knowing specifically how the public reporter arrived at the finding. 
12. Justification for the exception i~ the assumption that a public official will perform 
his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the 
record. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note. 
The principal basis for the presumption of trustworthiness of public records is 
the assumption that public officials will properly perform their duties with 
accuracy and fidelity. Officials have the duty to make accurate statements, and 
this special duty will usually suffice as a motive to incite the officer to its 
fulfillment. 
Grant, supra note 10, at 56 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 6. 
13. Courts have recognized the importance of having the jury hear the qualifications, 
including background and training, of expert witnesses. Murphy v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. 547 F.2d 816, 817 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Moreover, a jury can better assess the weight 
to be accorded an expert's opinion if the witness is permitted to explain his qualifications.") 
(citation omitted); see also Scharfenberger v. Wingo, 542 F.2d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(cross-examination concerning expert's qualifications is appropriate). There is no reason to 
believe that there is any less need for the jury to have information about the qualifications 
of the author of an opinion expressed in an investigative report than of an expert at trial. 
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Even if such an explanation appears in the report, without cross-
examination the opponent would have little or no opportunity to 
demonstrate weaknesses in the fact finder's methodology or to 
suggest better procedures that could have been employed. 14 
An even greater problem arises when reports are admitted con-
taining conclusions based in whole or in part upon the observation 
or information of third parties. Such information may not possess 
any guarantees of trustworthiness that customarily underlie the 
hearsay exceptions, yet still form the basis for a fact finding 
admitted under Rule 803(8)(C). 15 In fact, Rule 803(8)(C) has been 
14. The jury in such a situation would be deprived of several pieces of important 
information that could have been uncovered during cross-examination of the public fact 
finder. The witness's attention, for example, might have been drawn to material facts in 
the case not utilized by the fact finder in reaching his conclusion, and during cross-
examination the fact finder could be asked whether his conclusion would be modified by 
those additional facts. R. GrvENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE 39 (1985); 
T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 226 (2d ed. 1988). If the fact finder used 
certain techniques of investigation, the cross-examiner can point to other techniques that 
might have been equally or more effective. See T. MAUET, SUPRA, at 267. 
If the fact finder relied upon her expertise in a certain area, cross-examination may 
reveal that this area has not yet developed into an area of expertise commonly accepted 
by courts or others in the field. SeeM. BERGER, J. MITCHELL & R. CLARK, TRIAL ADVOCACY: 
PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY 421 (1989) (hereinafter BERGER). Cross-examination 
may also reveal that her conclusion is not beyond challenge, and therefore others in the 
field may arrive at different conclusions using the same data. See BERGER, supra at 422; 
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 157 (2d ed. 1973). Further, the expert fact finder 
can be confronted on cross-examination with learned treatises that may reveal opinions 
contradictory to those of the witness. See R. KEETON, supra at 158; J. Jeans, Trial 
Advocacy 335 (1975); see also FED. R. Evm. 803(18). 
15. Most of the hearsay exceptions involve situations in which the firsthand observer 
is also the declarant, and the exception is based on the reliability of the observer-declarant. 
For example, the excited utterance exception, Rule 803(2), is based on the assumption that 
"a condition of excitement ... temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces 
utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED. R. Evm. 803(2) advisory committee's note. 
The observer's statement about what he has witnessed is deemed reliable by the circum-
stances. Under Rule 803(8)(C), where the investigator has based her report on the statement 
of firsthand observers, nothing inherent in the situation guarantees the reliability or 
truthfulness of the original observer. The only other exception that allows admission of 
information obtained from the statement of others is Rule 803(6), the business records 
exception, which allows admission of records made "by, or from information transmitted 
by, a person with knowledge .... " FED. R. Evm. 803(6). This has been interpreted, 
however, to require not only the declarant, but also the supplier of the information to be 
acting in the regular course of business and therefore acting with a duty of accuracy. "If, 
however, the supplier of the information does not act in the regular course, an essential 
link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information itself, and 
the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail." FED. R. Evm. 
803(6) advisory committee's note. See,e.g., United States v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980). Under Rule 803(8)(C) 
nothing guarantees the accuracy of the original observer. There are, however, some situations 
(for example, where there has been a hearing with .vitnesses testifying under oath subject 
to cross-examination) falling under that subsection that may contain such a guarantee. 
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used to admit fact findings that have affirmative indicia of un-
trustworthiness. In In re Paducah Towing Co., 16 for example, the 
trial court used Rule 803(8)(C) to admit the findings of an admin-
istrative law judge ("ALJ") following a license revocation hearing 
regarding the reasonableness of a ship captain's actions. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed that the 
judge's findings appeared to be based largely on hearsay and 
unreliable testimony, yet the court approved of their admission 
because the opponent could not demonstrate explicitly the extent 
to which the ALJ relied upon the untrustworthy testimony .17 
In Paducah, therefore, the findings were admitted without an 
opportunity to examine the witness or the fact finder to determine 
either the basis for the decision or to what extent the fact finder 
relied upon the "unreliable" witness. Hearsay proscriptions and 
first-hand knowledge requirements were created to avoid such 
scenarios. 18 
Rule 803(8)(C) permits the use of such a fact finding without 
the presence of either the public reporter-fact finder or the third-
party informant. The opponent of the fact finding loses the 
opportunity to cross-examine both of these important witnesses. 
The jury, therefore, is likely to learn either directly or indirectly 
the observations of a third-party informant not examined for 
credibility or accuracy. 
B. Fact Findings Based upon Third-Party Informants 
Hearsay documents that contain additional hearsay are subject 
to the general rule that even though the document itself may 
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule (for example, a business 
record), hearsay statements within the document are inadmissible 
unless covered by their own exception. 19 Rule 803(6) does allow 
such double hearsay in business records, but only if the informant 
and the reporter are acting in the regular course of business. 20 If 
the informant is not within the business chain of information, the 
16. 692 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1982). 
17. /d. at 421. In addition, the court noted that the cross-examination of the unreliable 
witness, upon whom the judge apparently relied, was improperly curtailed at the hearing. 
/d. 
18. See infra note 31. 
19. "Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each 
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided 
in these rules." FED. R. Evm. 805. 
20. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) advisory committee's note. See supra note 15. 
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reliability of the hearsay contained in the record is substantially 
diminished, and the basis for the exception eroded. 21 
By contrast, Rule 803(8)(C), as interpreted by some courts, places 
no restriction on the source of the information in a public record, 
provided that there is no demonstrable lack of trustworthiness in 
the source.22 The source of the information and the hearsay state-
ment itself are presumed reliable because the public official has 
deemed the information sufficiently trustworthy to have based a 
factual finding upon it and it has been included in the public 
record. 23 In essence, the statute delegates the responsibility for 
deciding the admissibility of such hearsay and hearsay-based con-
clusions to the government reporter, with the court retaining 
ultimate veto power if the opponent can demonstrate a lack of 
trustworthiness. 24 
21. See supra note 15. 
22. The advisory committee's note to Rule 803(8)(C) says that the statute "assumes 
admissibility in the first instance." Not surprisingly, courts interpret this to place the 
burden on the opponent of the report to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness. See, e.g., 
Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v. Procter & 
Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 
412, 421 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Sage v. Rockwell lnt'l Corp., 477 F. Supp 1205, 1207 
(D.N.H. 1979). 
23. See supra note 6. 
24. The government reporter is deemed to be fair and to prepare accurate reports 
based on reliable information. See supra note 6. Because the burden of proof is on the 
opponent to show indicia of a lack of trustworthiness, an absence of information on the 
trustworthiness of the report or its sources is customarily no bar to admissibility under 
Rule 803(8)(C). Additionally, because a government reporter need not appear before the 
court to explain why his report and its sources are trustworthy, the court is, in effect, 
deferring to the judgment of the reporter. The combined effect of the burden of proof 
and the inclination to defer to the judgment of the government fact finder may lead to 
the admission of highly questionable evidence under Rule 803(8)(C). 
In Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, the finding of an ALJ regarding the reasonableness 
of a ship captain's actions was admitted at trial under Rule 803(8)(C), despite the court's 
finding that the key source was unreliable. Although it could not be determined precisely 
to what extent the finding was based on this source, "[t]he similarity between the ALJ's 
findings and Cole's [the source's] testimony is striking." !d. at 421. The court in Paducah 
asserted that the opponent of the fact finding had not met its burden of proving a lack of 
trustworthiness. !d. 
In Wolf ex ref. Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982), the 
court admitted into evidence a study undertaken by the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") 
regarding toxic shock syndrome, discounting allegations that the study was "hasty" and 
"methodologically flawed." The court admitted the study because the expertise of those 
conducting it was "assumed," and the above noted flaws, according to the court, went to 
the weight rather than the admissibility of the report. Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 625; see also 
Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D. Nev. 1982) (finding of aircraft 
investigation based in part upon tests done by investigator who admitted there was no 
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The conclusions of expert witnesses, like those of Rule 803(8)(C) 
public reporters, are generally admissible, although these conclu-
sions may be based to some degree on what was learned from 
others.25 Such witnesses, however, must be established as experts 
on the witness stand, and the use of third-party information must 
be of a type customarily used by experts in the field before their 
hearsay-based conclusions are admissible. 26 While the advisory 
committee note to Rule 803(8) includes the skill and experience of 
the public fact finder as one element used to assess the trustwor-
thiness of a report, neither expertise nor customary usage is a sine 
qua non for admissibility, as it is for live expert testimony. 27 This 
Article argues that they should be. 
More fundamental distinctions between the admission of the 
hearsay-based conclusion of an expert witness and one that appears 
in a public report admitted under Rule 803(8)(C) can be seen 
through consideration of the cross-examination of such a witness. 
In addition to challenging the expertise of the witness and the 
methodology used, the expert witness can be cross-examined re-
garding the reasons for relying upon third-party information and 
the guarantees of the informant's credibility and accuracy. 28 Thus, 
scientific basis for the tests and that he was not an expert in the area); Hess v. Arbogast, 
376 S.E.2d 333, 338-39 (W. Va. 1988) (loss of transcript upon which finding based no bar 
to admission of finding, using state statute identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C)). 
25. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing." 
FED. R. EviD. 703. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
26. "If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences . upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 703. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 136-39, 160 and accompanying text. 
28. The importance of cross-examining an expert witness concerning the information 
that she has relied upon in reaching her opinion is recognized by Rule 705. "The expert 
may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." 
FED. R. Evm. 705; see a/so S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 483 (3d ed. 1982) ("Our view is that it is very important for the cross-examiner 
to be able to probe the basis for an expert opinion and that great leeway should be given 
to the cross-examiner to test the opinion by asking about its data base."); United States 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316, 325 (D.N.J. 1976). 
The district court in Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064 
(E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978), recognized that 
the same need to examine the expert about his sources exists when the expert's opinion 
appears in a written report: 
However, where the foundation of an opinion would be discredited under Rule 
705 cross-examination, the presumptive trustworthiness of the opinion might well 
be sufficiently impugned to disqualify the report under 803(8)(C), thus requiring 
the proponent of the report either to produce the declarant for purposes of cross-
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although the opponent may not be able to challenge the informant, 
the expert can be challenged on matters relating directly to the 
informant's credibility and accuracy. Rule 803(8)(C), in contrast, 
dispenses with this crucial guarantee of reliability and undercuts 
traditional hearsay rules. 
Perhaps the danger of admitting Rule 803(8)(C) fact findings 
can be seen best through the following illustration. Police officers 
responding to the scenes of automobile accidents customarily write 
reports based on their observances and on eyewitness accounts. 29 
These reports often contain fact findings that are vital to the 
outcome of a lawsuit, such as which vehicle had the right-of-way 
or whether a pedestrian was walking in the crosswalk.30 Should 
juries be allowed to consider these conclusions without the oppo-
nent having had the opportunity to challenge either the officer or 
the eyewitness on this crucial, often subjective piece of testimony? 
If so, certainly there should be either strong guarantees of their 
trustworthiness or a compelling need to dispense with our system's 
time-tested method of determining accuracy and truthfulness-
cross-examination. 31 As often applied, Rule 803(8)(C) contains 
neither of these. 
examination or to forego use of the evidence. 
Id. at 1115. The court refused to hold, however, that all official reports were inadmissible 
merely because there was no opportunity to cross-examine the author of the report, beo;ause 
this would "drain the vitality of Rule 803(8)." /d. 
One technique for probing the expert's opinion is for the cross-examiner to pose his own 
hypothetical question to the expert using facts different or in addition to those used in 
forming the opinion in the report. See, e.g., J. JEANS, supra note 14, at 334; R. KEETON, 
supra note 14, at 163-64. 
It is noteworthy that an expert may testify under Rule 703 to conclusions based on 
information that would not otherwise be admissible. The possible unreliability of that 
information may not be discovered without cross-examination. J. McELHANEY, Mc-
ELHANEY's TRIAL NOTEBOOK 369 (2d ed. 1987). Although Rule 803(8)(C) has the "escape 
clause" requirement of trustworthiness, it is often impossible for the opponent to know 
whether untrustworthy information was relied upon before the report is offered into 
evidence. Comment, supra note 10, at 167. Given that the burden of proving the untrus-
tworthiness of the report under Rule 803(8)(C) is on the opponent, see supra note 22, the 
statute places the opponent in a particularly difficult position by depriving him of the 
opportunity to cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of his opinion. 
29. See, e.g., Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 
1981); Baker v. E1cona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 555-59 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 933 (1979); Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 529 (D. Md. 
1987). The same is true for police reports involving other types of accidents. See, e.g., 
Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1981) (wheelchair 
accident); Victory Park Apts., Inc. v. Axelson, 367 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D. 1985) (fire). 
30. See, e.g., Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 659 F.2d at 722 (exact location of the 
accident); Baker, 588 F.2d at 555 (which vehicle ran the red light); Ramrattan, 656 F. 
Supp. at 525-26 (who ran the red light). 
31. Wigmore called cross-examination "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine 
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C. Fact Findings Resulting from Hearings 
The admission of public officials' fact findings from a hearing 
present special problems under the rule. The admission of such 
findings may be significantly more prejudicial than those in a 
public official's own report, yet less probative of the issues to be 
determined at trial. 
The report of a public official who conducts an on-the-scene 
investigation and makes a subsequent fact finding based largely 
on personal knowledge may be an important piece of evidence 
because it is contemporaneous with the event, its inclusion of 
empirical observations, and especially because of its inability to be 
replicated at trial. 32 The fact finding reached after a hearing adds 
nothing to the jury's deliberation, other than the conclusion of 
another fact finder arrived at through a process similar to the one 
that the trial jury is undergoing. 33 This similarity in the process, 
basing a conclusion upon the testimony of witnesses, not only 
makes the determination by the hearing officer superfluous, but 
also creates undue prejudice for the opponent of the fact finding. 
ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE ON EviDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 
1940). The advisory committee's note to the Federal Rules of Evidence on hearsay observes 
that the "belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination, is effective in exposing imper-
fections of perception, memory, and narration is fundamental," FED. R. EVID. 801-06 
advisory committee's introductory note (citing E. MORGAN, FORWARD TO MODEL CODE OF 
EVIDENCE 37 (1942)). 
32. McCormick, in his influential article concerning investigative reports, argued: 
The following are some of the reasons for receiving the investigative report as 
evidence so far as the report is within the duty of the officer making it, including 
those portions based on what he is told by those who claim to know and including 
his conclusions. The most important reason is time. The officer comes on the 
scene usually as early as it is feasible to get there. Usually the investigators of 
the parties come later and the statements are frequently partial and one-sided. 
The witnesses at the trial have often only a dim recollection of the event, and 
their testimony rests mostly on their pre-trial refreshment of memory by these 
statements. The officer is often able to interview witnesses before they have been 
pulled one way or the other by the parties. The officer, too, is frequently a 
specialist-a doctor reporting death, a fire marshal investigating a fire-or at 
least experienced in like investigations, such as a highway patrolman reporting 
on a collision. 
McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigation?, 42 
IOWA L. REV. 363, 364-65 (1957). 
33. None of the reasons advanced by McCormick for allowing admission of investi-
gative reports, see supra note 32, apply when the fact finding is not the result of a timely, 
on-the-scene investigation, but rather made pursuant to a testimonial hearing. The hearing 
will likely involve the same witnesses testifying about the same matters as the present trial. 
Nothing important is added by knowing the hearing officer's reaction to the same evidence 
now being presented to the jury. 
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In Lloyd v. American Export Lines,34 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit found error in a trial court's 
exclusion of the "professional hearing examiner's" findings fol-
lowing a hearing concerning a shipboard fight. 35 The court held 
that the jury should be permitted to learn the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that there was insufficient credible evidence to determine 
that Lloyd was the aggressor, 36 a crucial issue in Lloyd's lawsuit 
against the ship company for negligence. The court's explanation 
for admission was that ''the hearing examiner did no more than 
summarize the evidence and point out inconsistencies. " 37 Such a 
finding necessarily involves a determination of credibility, and as 
such should be left to the jury alone to make the independent 
assessment that our system requires. 38 Even if the court's descrip-
tion of the conclusions was correct, however, there is little benefit 
and real danger in the jury's receiving a summary of witnesses' 
statements. 39 
Jurors learning that a presumably objective public official has 
reached a certain conclusion after hearing evidence similar to what 
they have heard may have difficulty reaching an opposite conclu-
sion. 40 Further, the jury is likely to deliberate on the correctness 
of the previous fact finding, rather than retaining the open-minded, 
34. 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978). 
35. /d. at 1181. 
36. /d. at 1182. 
37. /d. at 1183. 
38. But see United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); Coffin v. South Carolina Dept. of Social Servs., 562 F. 
Supp. 579, 591 (D.S.C. 1983) (upholding exclusion because investigator's report is unduly 
prejudicial). 
39. If the witnesses are present in court to be examined, then the examiner's summary 
of their previous testimony is unnecessary. Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 
1165 (3d Cir. 1979). If the witnesses are not present, admitting a summary of their previous 
testimony with no opportunity for cross-examination at trial possesses all of the dangers 
of hearsay. See Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 529 (D. Md. 1987); 
Victory Park Apts. Inc. v. Axelson, 367 N.W.2d 155, 161-62 (N.D. 1985). 
40. Although reports of government officials are generally presented to the jury in an 
"aura of special reliability," City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982), the fact finding reached after an evidentiary 
hearing before a public hearing examiner carries even greater weight with juries. See 
MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 230. The court in Coffin, 562 F. Supp. 579, excluded a report 
prepared after a hearing before a state human affairs commission because: 
the report may unduly prejudice the jury whose responsibility is to make a de 
novo determination of plaintiffs' claims and its conclusions are based in part on 
credibility determinations concerning the witnesses appearing at the hearing which 
undermine the exclusive province of the jury. 
/d. at 591. 
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first impression approach to the issues our system prefers.41 The 
emphasis likely to be placed on this fact finding by the jury is 
especially unfair where the opponent of the fact finding has had 
little or no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified 
at the hearing. 
In Perrin v. Anderson,42 for example, Rule 803(8)(C) was used 
to admit the conclusion of a police department shooting review 
board that the defendant police officers acted in accord with 
department policy during a shooting incident. The board, com-
posed entirely of police personnel, held nonadversarial hearings 
that consisted solely of questioning the defendants and their su-
periors. 43 Although the trial judge gave a limiting instruction 
regarding the finding, certainly the truth-finding process would 
have been better served by the jury's drawing its own conclusion 
regarding the propriety of the officer's actions after hearing the 
testimony of all of the witnesses and seeing them challenged 
through cross-examination. Then, if it is determined that it would 
be helpful to the jury to present expert testimony as to the propriety 
of the officer's actions, that expert should be called and cross-
examined in the presence of the jury.44 When (as in Perrin) Rule 
803(8)(C) is used to present to a jury a police board's fact finding 
based solely on police witnesses testifying without cross-examina-
tion, real prejudice will be done to the opponent of the fact 
finding. 
D. Insufficiency of Trustworthiness Factors 
The language of Rule 803(8)(C)-especially as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft-is broad enough to encompass 
a variety of reports, fact findings, and conclusions from different 
41. In MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 230, the court stated that "admission [of a preliminary 
army finding following a hearing] would have tended to perplex, in that it likely would 
have distracted the jury's attention from its task of ascertaining guilt or innocence to a 
second-guessing of the Government's conduct of the murder investigation." /d. See also 
Pullman, 662 F.2d at 915; Coffin, 562 F. Supp. at 591; United States v. American Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 368 (D.D.C. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub 
nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub 
nom. Matsushita E1ec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 
481 u.s. 1029 (1987). 
42. 784 F.2d 1040 (lOth Cir. 1986). 
43. /d. at 1046-47. 
44. See supra note 28 and accompanying text regarding the cross-examination of an 
expert witness. 
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types of public officials. 45 The procedure used by the public fact 
finder and the manner in which the finding is used vary, among 
other things, according to the nature of the official's job and the 
specific prerequisites sometimes mandated for using the finding. 46 
Different types of fact findings reached in different manners by 
investigators with different credentials deserve different treatment 
regarding their admissibility at trial. This is especially true, both 
because such variations can result in differences in reliability, and 
because under Rule 803(8)(C) the admission of certain types of 
government fact findings without cross-examination of either the 
fact finder or the informant can be extremely prejudicialY 
Social workers, for example, who visit a family's home to 
investigate a report of suspected child abuse may determine whether 
abuse has taken place based upon personal observations and from 
the statements of the child and neighbors. 48 Their findings are 
issued in an official Department of Human Resources report. The 
45. For examples of different types of fact findings admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), 
see Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1046-47 (finding of police shooting board regarding propriety of 
officer's actions); McClure v. Mexia lndep. School Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") determination of reasonable cause 
to believe plaintiff had been discharged because of sex discrimination); In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 
(1987) (Department of Treasury finding following fair-market-value investigation); Kehm 
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (CDC studies of victims 
of toxic shock syndrome); In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 420 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(license revocation hearing finding regarding reasonableness of ship captain's actions); 
Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (National 
Health & Safety Board ("NHSB") report regarding stopping distances for automobiles); 
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
933 (1979) (police report of automobile accident); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 
F.2d 1179, 1183 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Alvarez v. American Export Lines, 439 U.S. 
969 (1978) (hearing examiner's finding regarding assault charges); Melville v. American 
Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3d Cir. 1978) (Federal Aviation Administration 
Airworthiness Directive); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1354-
55 (6th Cir. 1978) (Health, Education & Welfare hearing examiner's findings regarding 
segregation presence in school system); Diaz v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 416 (E.D. 
Va. 1987) (judge advocate general ("JAG") report of shipboard fall). 
46. See, e.g., Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1046-47 (hearing without cross-examination before 
shooting review board composed of police personnel); Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 
745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984); Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 267-68; Paducah 
Towing Co., 692 F.2d at 420; Robbins, 653 F.2d at 50 (NHSB report regarding stopping 
distances for automobiles including information provided by automobile manufacturers); 
Baker, 588 F.2d at 558 (police accident report fact finding based on officer's own 
observations and statement of eyewitness); Diaz, 655 F. Supp. at 416 (E.D. Va. 1987) 
(summary of interviews with witnesses to accident). 
47. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
48. See, e.g., Mo. FAM. LAw CooE ANN.§ 5-706 (1989 & Supp. 1989). 
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Consumer Product Safety Commission officials who are investi-
gating the danger of a new toy may base their reports on statistical 
studies and tests performed on the toy.49 The panel established in 
many states to examine medical malpractice claims makes its 
findings in part on the sworn testimony of witnesses in a quasi-
trial that includes cross-examination.50 There may not be cross-
examination at the coroner's inquest, but sworn testimony will 
lead to a "verdict," including a conclusion as to the cause of 
deathY Each of these factual findings result "from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law" and should be ad-
missible in civil trials under Rule 803(8)(C), absent a showing of 
untrustworthiness. 52 Each finding, however, has been reached by 
a different procedure that contains greater or lesser assurances of 
trustworthiness, and therefore different risks of prejudice if ad-
mitted at trial. Thus, it is important that the admission of such 
findings at trial without cross-examination of the fact finder or 
the informant should occur only after carefully assessing the trust-
worthiness of the fact finders, their sources, and the process 
employed to reach the fact finding. Unfortunately, the factors 
provided by the advisory committee for Rule 803(8) for determining 
trustworthiness, as interpreted by many courts, are insufficient; 
moreover, they fail to recognize the differences discussed above. 53 
Further, no government fact finding should be admitted at trial 
without examination of the possible prejudice resulting from sub-
mitting such a fact finding to the jury through cross-examination 
of the fact finders or their sources. 54 
The only limitation found in Rule 803(8)(C) on the admission 
of fact findings within public reports which meet the general criteria 
of Rule 803(8), is that the report must not be untrustworthy. 55 It 
is most important, therefore, to determine whether the following 
trustworthiness factors found in the advisory committee note to 
the rule provide realistic assurances of reliability for fact findings 
based upon hearsay sources: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; 
(2) the special skill or experience of the official; (3) whether a 
49. See 16 C.F.R. § § 1118.1, 1501 (1989). 
50. See, e.g., Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN. § 3-2A-05 (1989); N.Y. JUDICIARY 
LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). 
51. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 27502-04 (West 1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 31, § § 10, 
15 (Smith-Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1989); OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § § 313.17, .19 (Anderson 
1987 & Supp. 1989). 
52. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C). 
53. See discussion of trustworthiness factors infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text. 
54. See discussion of prejudice infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. 
55. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C). 
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hearing was held and the level at which conducted; and (4) possible 
motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hojjman. 56 Each of 
these factors may be useful in determining the trustworthiness of 
certain public reports. In evaluating other public reports, however, 
even reliance upon all of the factors can be unhelpful and may 
result in the admission of hearsay-based fact findings without 
adequate assurances of reliability. Perhaps the following example 
will demonstrate this. 
One common public report likely to contain fact findings based 
at least in part upon third-party statements is the standard police 
report compiled after an automobile accident. Assume an officer 
responds immediately to the scene of an accident and compiles a 
report expeditiously. Further assume that the officer is an experi-
enced and able accident investigator, perhaps qualifying as an 
"expert accidentologist" in those jurisdictions that recognize such 
an expertise. 57 Many courts apparently find it irrelevant when 
evaluating reports where no hearing is customarily held, that no 
hearing is held prior to the officer's fact findings. 58 Thus, three 
of the advisory committee's factors have been removed as obstacles· 
to the trustworthiness of the report, and the final criteria may be 
explored-"motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hojj-
man."59 
Palmer,60 a railroad accident case, discussed the admissibility of 
a report prepared by the defendant railroad company that included 
a statement by the main engineer as to the cause of the accident. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge that 
the report could not qualify as a business record under a prede-
cessor statute to Rule 803(6).61 The Court held that although a 
56. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note. 
57. See, e.g., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 441 U. S. 933 (1979); see also infra note 152 and accompanying text. But see FED. 
R. Evm. 703 advisory committee's note (disallowing use of such an "accidentologist's" 
opinion regarding the point of impact based on statements of bystanders, apparently 
because the committee concluded that such statements are not normally relied upon by 
experts in the field). 
58. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 268 (3d Cir. 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); Baker, 588 F.2d at 558; United States 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 365-66 (D.D.C. 1980); State v. Manke, 
328 N.W.2d 799, 803 (N.D. 1988) (interpreting state equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(8)(C)). 
59. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note. 
60. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
61. /d. at 111, 113-15 (interpreting Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 640, §I, 49 Stat. 1561 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988))). 
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report prepared by the railroad company regarding an accident 
caused by one of its trains "may have some relationship" to its 
business, it is not within the regular course of its business to 
prepare such reports.62 Thus, fundamentally, the use of such a 
self-serving report, prepared in part for litigation, would ignore 
the nonobjective character of the records and would result in 
questionable reliability because of "their source and origin and 
the nature of their compilation. " 63 
Therefore, if the officer in our automobile accident bases the 
fact finding upon a statement of a witness who happens to be the 
spouse of the defendant driver, the lack of objectivity of such a 
source might result in the exclusion of the report.64 Nonetheless, 
in at least one frequently cited Rule 803(8)(C) case, Baker v. 
Elcona Homes, 65 the court admitted a police accident report con-
taining a fact finding based in part on the self-serving statement 
of a truck driver who worked for the defendant. 66 The court 
achieved this result by interpreting the advisory committee's caution 
concerning motivation problems as applying only to the preparer 
of the report and not to the source of the information. 67 This 
approach ignores both the thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Palme~8 and the actual language of Rule 803(8)(C).69 However, 
62. Id. at 114. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 
1981); Escrow Disbursements Ins. Agency v. American Title & Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 302, 
304-05 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 518 F. Supp. 1387, 1390-91 
(N.D. Ill. 1981). 
65. 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). 
66. /d. at 556-59. The driver's statement itself was not admitted under Rule 803(8)(C) 
because it was not a "factual finding." It was, however, determined to be admissible to 
rebut an allegation of recent fabrication under Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). 
67. /d. at 558. But see Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 6~9 F.2d 721 (court disallowed 
a similar police accident report because it was based in part on the story of a "biased 
eyewitness"). The court stated, "[t]he trial process is better served when a biased eyewitness 
declarant is required to testify directly and to be subject to cross-examination. To permit 
his opinion to be heard through the testimony of an official. would cloak it with undeserved 
authority that could unduly sway a jury." /d. at 722. 
68. See infra note 158. 
69. The Baker court quoted the statute denying admissibility when the "sources of the 
information or the circumstances" Jack trustworthiness. Baker, 588 F.2d at 558 (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note). When applying the advisory commit-
tee's factors of trustworthiness to the facts of the present case with respect to motivation, 
however, the court noted only that "there is no indication that the report was made with 
improper motive. Sgt. Hendrickson was completely independent of both parties" and 
impartial. /d. Thus, the court never considered the motivation of one important and likely 
biased source of information, the driver. See also Anaya v. New Mexico State Personnel 
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the rationale for Rule 803(8)(C), apparently relied upon by the 
Baker court, is that public officials will consider the possible bias 
of the source before using it in arriving at their fact finding 
because of their objectivity and appreciation of the need for 
accuracy in public documents. 70 Thus, there is some support for 
admitting a police report under Rule 803(8)(C), even where the 
fact finding is based in part on the hearsay statement of a biased 
source, as long as the officer's objectivity is clear. 
If the eyewitness to the accident upon whom the officer bases 
the fact finding has no relationship to either of ~he parties, there 
would seem to be no motivation problem, and thus no barrier to 
the admission of the report. Although the admission of such a 
document could be construed as a faithful application of Rule 
803(8)(C), such a ruling would constitute an unwarranted and 
perhaps dangerous expansion of the existing hearsay exceptions 
for several reasons. 
First, if the officer were to testify orally to the hearsay-based 
conclusion, it would be admissible only if the officer were recog-
nized as an expert by the court and if the officer relied upon the 
type of information customarily relied upon by experts in the field. 
Unlike the ambiguity of the Rule 803(8)(C) factors, both of these 
are clear prerequisites to receiving the officer's conclusion under 
Rules 702 and 703, and they could be tested by cross-examination.71 
Including the findings in a report should not constitute a license 
for overcoming hearsay and first-hand knowledge proscriptions.72 
Second, when hearsay-based fact findings in a police report are 
admitted, the officer becomes the real judge of the credibility and 
accuracy of the eyewitness. Without the opportunity to hear cross-
examination of either the officer or the eyewitness, the jury would 
be deprived of the ability to assess the accuracy of the eyewitness's 
account or even to hear why the officer regarded the witness as 
reliable enough to base opinions upon. The judge also would not 
be able to make a meaningful determination of the trustworthiness 
of the report as required by Rule 803(8)(C).73 Additionally, in civil 
cases, a police report carries the imprimatur of government objec-
Bd., 107 N.M. 622, 628, 762 P.2d 909, 914 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), in which a report 
concerning the causes of a prison escape was admitted against a corrections officer under 
a state statute identical to Rule 803(8)(C), although the sources of the information for the 
report were accomplices to the escapee and other inmates. In response to the officer's 
claim that these sources were untrustworthy, the court stated, "it is the trustworthiness of 
the report that is relevant." I d. at 914 (emphasis in original). 
70. See supra note 6. 
71. See FED. R. Evm. 702-03; see also infra notes 121-58 and accompanying text. 
72. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
73. The impetus for dispensing with the appearance of the public official at trial under 
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tivity and reliability, thus making its use by the jury extremely 
prejudicial. 74 Given the questionable value of receiving such reports 
without the police or eyewitness testifying, it is hardly surprising 
that a number of states that have enacted statutes based upon the 
Federal Rules of Evidence have excluded police reports from 
coverage under Rule 803(8)(C) or its equivalent.75 
E. Lack of Consistent Application 
Finally, Rule 803(8)(C) effectively contradicts one stated purpose 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence: increasing the consistency of 
Rule 803(8)(C) is stated as the following: 
the inconvenience of requiring public officials to . . . testify concerning the 
subject matter of their records and reports. Not only would this disrupt the 
administration of public affairs, but it almost certainly would create a class of 
official witnesses. Moreover, given the volume of business in public offices, the 
official written statement will usually be more reliable than the official's present 
memory. 
McCoRMICK, supra note l, at 889 (footnotes omitted). 
Although such rationales may apply to certain types of government documents when the 
public official's connection to the document is largely ministerial, these justifications are 
largely misplaced when applied to police accident reports. Police officers are so frequently 
called upon as witnesses in a variety of proceedings that testifying in court is a regular 
part of their job. Additionally, while the preparer is likely to forget certain information in 
a public document, an officer's fact findings (for example, his determination of the cause 
of an accident) is more likely to be remembered, especially after having his recollection 
refreshed by the document. 
In any event, when a document contains the subjective opinion of a public official 
regarding perhaps the crucial issue, such as who caused the accident, should the inconven-
ience to the public official justify receipt of his opinion without cross-examination? 
74. See infra note 188. 
75. Oklahoma adopted Rule 803(8)(C) but specifically excluded police investigative 
reports from coverage under the statute. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note I, at 272. North Dakota's 
statutory equivalent of Rule 803(8)(C) does not contain such an exclusion, but in Victory 
Park Apts. v. Axelson, 367 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1985), the state's highest court disallowed 
a police report containing a summary of the statements of witnesses to a fire. The court 
referred to Baker as a "liberal" interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C) and distinguished Baker 
because the officer in that case relied in large part on his own observations and calculations. 
/d. at 161-62. 
Arkansas, Maine, Montana, and Vermont have chosen to adopt the Revised Uniform 
Rule of Evidence 803(8), which specifically excludes "investigative reports by police and 
other law enforcement personnel." See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note I, at 273-74. In the 
advisory note to Maine's equivalent of Rule 803(8), the commentators assert that such a 
limitation "expressed better policy . . . in requiring the official to testify, rather than 
admitting his report as a hearsay exception." !d. at 274. 
Similarly the prevailing view expressed by courts in states that have not adopted the 
Federal Rules of Evidence is to disallow police investigative reports containing conclusions 
or findings of fact, especially if based on more than the investigator's own observations 
and calculations. See Annotation, Admissibility in State Court Proceedings of Police Reports 
Under Official Record Exception to Hearsay Rule, 31 A.L.R. 4th 913 (1984). 
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evidentiary rulings in the federal courts. 76 Rule 803(8)(C) invites 
disparate treatment of the admissibility of public reports and fact 
findings through its broad language, its multifactored approach, 
and its controversial expansion of the amount and type of hearsay 
admitted at trial. Not surprisingly, the federal courts have differed 
widely in their approach to hearsay-based public fact findings 
admitted under Rule 803(8)(C). Although the Supreme Court's 
holding in Beech Aircraft resolved one cause for inconsistent 
803(8)(C) rulings,77 many remain. 
For a public report to be admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), it 
must not lack trustworthiness. Some courts, however, apparently 
view all hearsay not subject to one of the Rule 803 or 804 
exceptions as inherently untrustworthy, and thus exclude reports 
containing findings based on third party observations.78 While such 
an approach would avoid many of the problems addressed above, 
it seems to conflict with one of the purposes of Rule 803(8)(C).79 
Other courts and commentators seem to suggest that Rule 
803(8)(C) admits all public reports unless the opponent can dem-
onstrate untrustworthiness. 80 The courts presume reliability in the 
76. Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32 FED. B.J. 225, 
228-29 (1974); Message of President Ford to Congress, Nov. 1974, cited in J. WEINSTEIN, 
supra note I, at preface p. X. 
77. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
78. See Miller v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 697 F.2d 141, 144 (6th Cir. 1983); McKinnon 
v. Ski! Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 278 (1st Cir. 1980); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
756 F.2d 19, 22 (6th Cir. 1984) ("unverified" hearsay in public report is untrustworthy). 
79. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note I, at 240-41 (noting that investigative reports covered 
under Rule 803(8)(C) necessarily include more than the public official's own observations). 
Weinstein concludes that while the introductory notes to Rule 803 explicitly retain the 
firsthand knowledge requirement, the requirement must be "liberally construed" and 
"interpreted flexibly" when applied to Rule 803(8)(C). /d. See also United States v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 364 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that if public 
reports are not untrustworthy, Rule 803(8)(C) dispenses with the ban on double hearsay); 
In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 Bankr. 373, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Japanese 
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 268 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 
481 u.s. 1029 (1987). 
Rule 803(8)(C) is itself silent on the firsthand knowledge requirement, J. WEINSTEIN, 
supra note I, at 240, and this silence has led to judicial attempts to harmonize the two. 
One novel judicial approach to the firsthand knowledge requirement motivated by Rule 
803(8)(C) is the notion that the requirement is satisfied in a public report if the author had 
firsthand knowledge "of the statements made by declarants who did have firsthand 
knowledge of the facts." Fraley v. Rockwell lnt'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1266-67 (S.D. 
Ohio 1979); see also Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 652 (D. Nev. 1982). 
80. See Melville v. American Home Assurance, 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3d Cir. 1978); 
United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978); Wolf 
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absence of positive or negative indicia of the reliability of the 
report, the reporter, or the sources of the information in the 
report. 81 This may be due to the importance attached to the 
presumably objective public official having chosen to rely on the 
informant and having put his findings in an official record. 82 
A primary reason for inconsistent 803(8)(C) rulings is that the 
courts have taken different approaches in applying the trustwor-
thiness factors. Some courts pay only lip service to the advisory 
committee's factors, 83 some courts add to them,84 and every court 
ex. ref. Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 625 (D.N,J. 1982); Sage v. 
Rockwell, 477 F. Supp. 1205, 1206-07 (D.N.H. 1979); J. WEINSTEIN, supra note I, at 248-
49. 
81. See Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983); In 
re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 421 (6th Cir. 1982); Melville, 584 F.2d at 1315; 
Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 625. 
82. See supra note 6. 
83. Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d at 421 (court admitted the transcript and the fact 
findings of a Coast Guard administrative hearing even though apparent key source was 
"unreliable"); Diaz v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 416 (E.D. Va. 1987) (report 
admitted although investigator had neither legal nor investigative skills); Revlon, Inc. v. 
Carson Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (two-year delay in preparing 
report does not result fn exclusion based on timeliness factor) rev'd, 803 F.2d 676 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); see also Anaya v. New Mexico State Personnel 
Bd., 762 P.2d 909, 914 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (The Court reached the same result in state 
adopting equivalent of Rule 803(8)(C). Trustworthiness of report, not source, matters.). 
One way in which courts minimize the limiting effect on admissibility of the advisory 
committee's factors is to claim that problems respecting the factors go to the weight and 
not the admissibility of the document. Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 625 (study described as 
"hasty" and "methodologically flawed"); Walker, 554 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (investigator 
who performed tests had no expertise in that area and no scientific bases for the tests); 
Sage, 477 F. Supp. at 1209 (inexperience of investigator). 
84. The advisory committee's note to Rule 803(8) explicitly allows courts to use 
additional criteria. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial, 505 F. Supp. 
1125, 1147 (E. D. Pa. 1980), aff 'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese 
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987), Judge Becker developed seven new factors for 
determining trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(C). The Third Circuit, noting the presumption 
of reliability that attaches to public records, either rejected or placed only minimal emphasis 
on the majority of Judge Becker's factors. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
723 F.2d 238, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matusushita Elec. 
Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 474 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
For a list of other courts that have added factors of trustworthiness to those listed by 
the advisory committee or otherwise amplified the definition of "factual findings," see 
Pierce, Admission of Expert Testimony in Hearsay Form: Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6), 
803(8)(C) and 803(18), 17 FoRUM 500, 503 (1982); see also Bright v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 22 (6th Cir. 1984) (unverified hearsay untrustworthy); New York 
v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) 
(interim report not "findings"); McKinnon v. Skit Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 278 (1st Cir. 1981) 
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seems to have its own understanding of what the factors mean. 
For example, some courts have discounted the factor dealing with 
whether a hearing was held, often reasoning that certain types of 
fact findings are generally arrived at without hearings.85 When a 
hearing has been held, some courts weigh heavily whether cross-
examination occurred at the hearing,86 while others seem satisfied 
merely that there was no overt bias displayed by the hearing 
examiner. 87 
The disparate treatment accorded to the factor involving the 
special skill of the investigator is even more pronounced. Some 
courts graft Article VII of the Federal Rules onto Rule 803(8)(C) 
and weigh heavily whether the fact finding was performed by an 
expert prior to its admission. 88 Others view the skill and experience 
of the investigator as bearing primarily on the weight to be given 
the report, rather than its admissibility. 89 
In one recent case, Diaz v. United States,90 the report of a Judge 
Advocate General ("JAG") officer containing "summaries" of his 
interviews with witnesses to an accident was admitted even though 
the officer "did not have any particular legal or investigative 
skills," because "the scope of the informal investigation was 
sufficiently narrow so that special skill or experience was not 
essential. " 91 Such a cursory dismissal of the skill factor by the 
court raises several questions. Is such lack of credentials to be 
(double hearsay makes report untrustworthy); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
498 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1980) (prospective, policy-oriented, rule-making procedure 
"used primarily for predictive purposes" not a fact finding). 
85. Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 268; Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 
551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Cohen v. General Motors 
Corp., 534 F. Supp. 509, 513 (W.D. Mo. 1982); State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799, 803 
(N.D. 1982) (applying equivalent of Rule 803(8)(C)). 
86. Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 821 (lOth Cir. 1981); Coffin v. 
South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 591 n.S (D.S.C. 1983); Zenith 
Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 1147, 1155-56; Fowler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 92 
F.R.D. I, 2 (N.D. Miss. 1980). 
87. Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (lOth Cir. 1986); Japanese Elec. 
Prods., 723 F.2d at 268; In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 Bankr. 373, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1988). 
88. See infra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Matthews v. Ashland Chern. 
Inc., 770 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1985); Baker, 588 F.2d at 558; Fraley v. Rockwell 
Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (court allowed one naval airplane 
crash report, but disallowed another because of the experience level of individual investi-
gators). 
89. Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D. Nev. 1982); Sage v. 
Rockwell, 477 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.N.H. 1979). 
90. 655 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
91. /d. at 416. 
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overcome by the "informal" nature of the investigation? If so, 
how does this impact on the factor that suggests that the holding 
of a hearing should raise the likelihood of admission? More 
fundamentally, what benefit exists to submitting the report of a 
nonexpert fact finder that is nothing more than a collection of 
third party statements, merely because the fact finder or reporter 
is a public official? Surely whatever benefit is achieved by admis-
sion of such a document is outweighed by the inability of the 
opponent to cross-examine the unchallenged versions of the wit-
nesses that have been summarized by the government reporter. 92 
Clearly, if the reporter had been a witness, the reporter would not 
have been permitted to give summaries of the witnesses' state-
ments.93 
The last advisory committee factor concerns motivation prob-
lems. As discussed earlier, some courts have ignored the apparent 
bias of the source of the information because of the objectivity 
of the public investigator, who presumably takes the source's bias 
into consideration.94 In Diaz, the court reasoned that although the 
JAG officer was a representative of a party litigant, the report 
was unbiased because it was prepared primarily for nonlitigation 
purposes. 95 
In addition to the enumerated factors, the advisory committee 
invited courts to develop other factors for evaluating trustworthi-
ness. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita, 96 for example, Judge 
Becker added seven factors to those of the committee.97 These 
92. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
93. See infra text accompanying note 127. 
94. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
95. Diaz, 655 F. Supp. at 416. Interestingly, the notion that an accident report is 
prepared primarily for nonlitigation purposes and therefore presumptively not biased is 
similar to the position rejected by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 
109, 113 (1943). Palmer, it should be remembered, is the case cited by the advisory 
committee regarding the trustworthiness criteria of motivation. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C) 
advisory committee's note. 
96. 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In 
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
97. /d. at 1147. These factors are as follows: 
I) The finality of the fact finding. 
2) Was the finding based upon largely inadmissible evidence, for example, 
hearsay? 
3) If the result of a hearing, were there procedural safeguards? 
4) Is there an ascertainable record? 
5) Was the finding actually more of a statement of policy? 
6) Is the finding based upon another finding which is of questionable accuracy? 
790 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
factors, while leading to a more thorough assessment of trustwor-
thiness, will obviously result in a markedly different approach to 
Rule 803(8)(C) in this particular courtroom from approaches taken 
in others. 
Courts have also disagreed about what type of information 
within a report is admissible under Rule 803(8)(C). Some would 
admit the fact findings but not the hearsay upon which they are 
based.98 Other courts allow the third-party statements as well. 99 
Still other courts permit the statements not for their truth, but 
only to demonstrate their impact upon the factual findings reached 
within the report. 100 
Ill. THE BEECH AIRCRAFT DECISION 
In Beech Aircraft v. Rainey Corp., 101 the spouses of two Navy 
pilots killed in an airplane crash brought suit against the manu-
facturer and the company that serviced the plane. 102 At trial, the 
defendants attempted to introduce portions of a report prepared 
7) If the finding includes the opinion of an expert, is it based upon the type of 
information customarily used by experts in the field? 
The Third Circuit, partially affirming and partially reversing Judge Becker's decision, 
stated: "The trial court gave undue weight to considerations either legally irrelevant under 
Rule 803(8)(C) or of only slight relevance, and too little weight to the fact that the 
investigation was conducted by officials charged with a legal duty to conduct it, for an 
important governmental purpose." In re Japanese Elec. Prods Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 
238, 269 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
The reasoning of the appellate court in Zenith Radio diminishes the protections against 
admitting hearsay that may be both unreliable and prejudicial. The justification offered 
for obviating the need for these protections is that the fact fittding involved was conducted 
by public officials in a proper manner for important reasons. Such a justification in essence 
delegates to the public officials the determination of trustworthiness required by Rule 
803(8)(C) prior to the admission of a fact finding in a public record. See supra note 24. 
98. See In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 415-21 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. 
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 
(1979); Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 530 (D. Md. 1987); Victory 
Park Apts. v. Axelson, 367 N.W.2d 155, 161-62 (N.D. 1985) (state equivalent of Rule 
803(8)(C)). 
Some courts have not allowed the double hearsay or the fact finding based upon· it. See, 
e.g., McKinnon v. Skit Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 278 (1st Cir. 1981); John McShain, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1977). 
99. Ellis v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1984); Robbins v. 
Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Diaz v. 
United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 415-17 (E.D. Va. 1987) (summary of witness's statements). 
100. Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (lith Cir. 1984). 
101. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988). 
102. /d. at 443. 
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by a Navy investigator pursuant to authority granted in the Manual 
of the Judge Advocate General. This JAG Report, written after a 
six-week investigation, attempted to fix the cause of the crash and 
contained "findings of fact," "opinions," and "recommenda-
tions." 103 The trial judge found the report sufficiently trustworthy 
to be admitted under Rule 803(8)(C), but originally held that it 
'' 'would be admissible only on its factual findings and would not 
be admissible insofar as any opinions or conclusions are 
concerned.' " 104 The day before trial the court reversed itself and 
held that most of the conclusions and opinions, including those 
as to the cause of the crash, could be admitted. 105 
After a jury verdict for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. 
An Eleventh Circuit panel reversed on the basis of a Fifth Circuit 
precedent that held that Rule 803(8)(C) did not encompass eval-
uative conclusions or opinions. 106 This decision was upheld after 
rehearing en bane by an equally divided court. 107 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to ''address a longstanding conflict among 
the federal courts of appeal over whether Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(8)(C), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for 
public investigatory reports containing 'factual findings,' extends 
to conclusions and opinions contained in such reports." 108 
The Court first turned to the statutory language and refused to 
read the term "factual findings" as meaning only "facts." It 
103. /d. 
104. Id. at 444. 
105. The two most important conclusions admitted concerned "the impossibility of 
determining exactly what happened" to the aircraft and the "failure to maintain a proper 
interval as '[t]he most probable cause of the accident.'" /d. 
106. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (lith Cir. 1986) (following 
Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 
S. Ct. 439 (1988). The court also held that the case should be reversed because the district 
court had improperly restricted cross-examination of the plaintiff by his own attorney 
concerning a letter he had written to the Navy. /d. at 1529-30. This portion of the court's 
holding was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 450-
53. . 
107. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498 (lith Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988). 
108. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 442-43. The Court noted that except for the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, all other courts of appeal that had faced the question had taken 
the "broader" view admitting opinions and conclusions contained in an investigative report. 
/d. at 446 (citing Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 918 (1986); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (lOth Cir. 1986); Ellis v. 
International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble 
Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983); Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 
584 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1978); Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 557-
58 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979)). 
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determined that "finding of fact" was a broader term, often 
meaning " '[a] conclusion by way of reasonable inference from 
the evidence.' " 109 Further, the Court noted that the rule does not 
allow for the admission of only "factual findings" in a report, 
but rather for the admission of " 'reports ... setting forth ... 
factual findings.' " 110 
The Court next turned to the legislative history, but found no 
clear answer because House and Senate committees took "diamet-
rically opposite positions" on this issue, and Congress made no 
effort to reconcile their differences. 111 The Court found the broader 
Senate view allowing admission of conclusions and opinions more 
in accord not only with the language of the rule, but also with 
the comments of the advisory committee. The Court noted that 
the advisory committee made no mention of any distinction be-
tween statements of fact and opinions and conclusions. Further-
more, the committee's examples of when reports had been admitted 
either by the courts or by federal statute were all reports that 
stated conclusions. 112 The Court found that the committee intended 
the trustworthiness requirement to be the major safeguard of the 
rule and not "an arbitrary distinction" between fact and opinion. 113 
The Court also noted the difficulty in trying to distinguish 
between fact and opinion, citing a number of commentators who 
have found this a false distinction which is "at best, one of 
degree.'' 114 Finally, the Court found the broad approach consistent 
with the federal rules' general approach of relaxing the traditional 
barriers to opinion testimony. 115 
The Court found, therefore, "that portions of investigatory 
reports otherwise admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) are not inad-
missible merely because they state a· conclusion or opinion.'' 116 
This result is reasonable and consistent with the determinations of 
109. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 447 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (5th ed. 
1979)). 
110. /d. (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(8)). 
Ill. !d. The House Judiciary Committee took the narrower view that conclusions and 
opinions should not be admitted, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1973), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7088, while the Senate took 
the broader view favoring admissibility, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 18, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7064. 
112. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 448. 
113. !d. 
114. /d. at 449 (citing W. KING & D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 4 (1942); 
McCORMICK, supra note I, at 27; McCormick, Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 DRAKE L. 
REV. 245, 246 (1970)). 
115. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 450. 
116. /d. 
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most courts117 and commentators1'18 who have addressed the ques-
tion. It does not address the question, however, of what conclu-
sions and opinions contained in evaluative reports should be 
admissible. The next section sets forth some criteria by using the 
expert opinion rules in conjunction with Rule 803(8)(C). 
IV. READING RULE 803(8)(C) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RULES 
ON EXPERT WITNESSES 
A. General Guideline 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) allows admission of factual 
findings in a government report resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to law. The Supreme Court, in Beech Aircraft, has 
given a broad interpretation to "factual findings" to include 
"conclusions and opinions" of the investigator. 119 It is important 
to recognize, however, that merely because such a conclusion or 
opinion fits within the parameters of Rule 803(8)(C), it is not 
automatically admissible into evidence. Rather, it is merely "not 
excluded by the hearsay rule." 120 The opinion or conclusion may 
still be inadmissible for other reasons, such as lack of personal 
knowledge of the declarant, 121 as an improper opinion, 122 or because 
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 123 
The purpose of Rule 803(8)(C), like all hearsay exceptions, is to 
allow admission of an out-of-court statement by declarant, rather 
than requiring that the statement be given live in court. No hearsay 
exception, including Rule 803(8)(C), should be extended to allow 
admission of an out-of-court statement that would not be admis-
sible if the declarant were to make the same statement in court 
under oath. Therefore, Rule 803(8)(C) should be interpreted in 
117. See supra note 108. 
118. See McCORMICK, supra note I, at 890-91 n.7; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra 
note I, at 803(8)[03]; Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard for the Public Records and 
Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 W. ST. L. REv. 53, 81 (1984); Note, supra note 10, at 157-
59. 
119. 109 S. Ct. at 450. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 
101-18. 
120. FED. R. EVID. 803. Rules 803 and 804 are exceptions to Rule 802, which provides: 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. 
Evm. 802. Rule 803 does not provide that the listed exceptions be automatically admissible 
in evidence but merely that they "are not excluded by the hearsay rule." FED. R. Evm. 
803. 
121. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29. 
122. See infra text accompanying notes 130-39. 
123. See infra text accompanying notes 187-200. 
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such a manner that "factual findings" contained in an investigative 
report should not be admissible unless the author of that report 
would have been permitted to testify as to those findings if present 
in court. 
B. Findings Based on Hearsay: Experts Versus Nonexperts 
A problem manifests itself when the investigator's findings are 
based, not only on his personal observations, but also on the 
hearsay statements of others. Because Rule 803 lists. exceptions to 
the rule against hearsay and is not a rule of admissibility, such a 
finding would, at first blush, not appear admissible because it is 
not based on the declarant's personal knowledge. The advisory 
committee's notes to Rule 803 state that "In a hearsay situation, 
the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor 
Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowl-
edge. "124 
Rule 803, however, clearly envisions the admissibility of at least 
some findings not based on personal knowledge under section C. 
Otherwise, section C would be largely superfluous, because section 
B already applies to any "matters observed pursuant to duty" and 
would therefore apply in most situations where the investigator's 
findings were based on personal knowledge. 125 
The most reasonable way to solve this apparent paradox is to 
read Rule 803(8)(C) in conjunction with the rules for expert 
witnesses. 126 To determine whether an investigator's findings would 
be admissible if the investigator were testifying in person, it must 
first be determined whether the investigator would qualify as an 
expert at trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 602, a nonexpert witness may only testify as 
to facts which he has personally observed. 127 Therefore, if the 
investigators of the report would not qualify as expert witnesses, 
they would not be allowed to testify in person to facts that they 
had learned through hearsay sources. Their written report, if based 
on hearsay, should also not be admitted. 
124. FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. 
125. Section 803(8)(8) "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed 
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel .... " FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(8). 
126. FED. R. Evm. 701-06. 
127. FED. R. Evm. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter .... This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony 
by expert witnesses."). 
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In contrast, expert witnesses may base their testimony on facts 
or data made known to them before the hearing, and as long as 
they are of the type normally relied on by experts in the field, 
they need not be admissible. 128 Therefore, if the investigators could 
be considered experts, then the factual findings in their reports 
would be admissible even if based on hearsay, as long as it was 
the kind of hearsay on which experts in their field would normally 
rely.tz9 
To apply this distinction, consider again the example of a police 
officer who, based on interviews with witnesses at the scene of an 
accident, determines that the light was red for one driver and 
green for another. If testifying in person at trial, the officer could 
not give that evidence unless held to be an expert witness. This 
same standard should be held with regard to the admissibility of 
the report, which should not be given any greater credence than 
the officer's live testimony. 
C. Opinions of a Nonexpert 
An additional problem arises if the investigative report contains 
the conclusions and opinions of the investigator. Although the 
Supreme Court held in Beech Aircraft that factual findings ad-
missible under Rule 803(8)(C) included opinions and conclusions, 
it again failed to draw the necessary distinction between the 
opinions of an expert and nonexpert investigator. 
The opinions of expert witnesses are generally admissible. 130 The 
opinions of nonexperts, although more freely admitted under the 
federal rules than under the common law, are still more limited 
than the opinions of experts. 131 In addition, to meet the requirement 
of first-hand knowledge, the opinion or inference must be "helpful 
to a clear understanding of [the witness's] testimony or the deter-
128. Rule 703 reads: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence. 
FED. R. Evm. 703. Allowing experts to testify based on data not presented in court and 
not perceived by the expert personally constituted a broadening of the common-law rule. 
FED. R. Evm. 703 advisory committee's note. 
129. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
130. FED. R. Evm. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."). 
131. See McCORMICK, supra note I, at 26-29. 
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mination of a fact in issue." 132 For example, a lay witness could 
testify that a person appeared drunk, 133 but probably could not 
give an opinion that the defendant was at fault in the accident. 134 
An expert, on the other hand, might be able to give such an 
opinion. 135 
In Beech Aircraft, before holding that the investigator's conclu-
sion that the accident was probably the result of pilot error was 
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), the Supreme Court should have 
determined whether he would have been qualified as an expert 
witness to provide such an opinion. The Court did discuss the 
expertise of the investigator, as one of the advisory committee's 
"factors" in determining the admissibility of a report under Rule 
803(8)(C) is the "special skill or experience of the official." 136 
Rather than merely a "factor" to be considered, however, the 
expertise of the officials should be a sine qua non of admitting 
the written opinion in their report. 137 
Obviously, judges cannot gauge as accurately the expertise of 
an official who authored a government report offered into evidence 
as they can evaluate a proposed expert testifying in person, where 
an individual voir dire would normally be conducted. 138 Most 
judges seem to have shifted the burden of proof on the issue of 
132. FED. R. Evm. 701. 
133. Singletary v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1980). 
134. Such an opinion would probably not be considered "helpful" to the jury under 
Rule 701 and would be required to be stated in more concrete terms. See generally J. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note I, § 701[02). 
135. Expert opinion testimony is not inadmissible "because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. Evm. 704(a). 
136. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note (discussed in Beech Aircraft Corp. 
v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 449 n.ll (1988)). The Court compared another case involving 
a similar JAG report which was held inadmissible because prepared by an inexperienced 
investigator. Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
137. In Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064 (1977), rev'd, 
548 F .2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978), the court accepted the proposition advanced that Rule 
803(8)(C) must be harmonized with Rule 702 and that the author of the report must have 
sufficient expertise to render the opinion in the report. 
An initial finding that A.D.'s were admissible over a hearsay objection did not 
preclude defendant from raising an objection to the expertise of the F.A.A .... 
Thus under both 703 and 803(8)(C) the proper focus is on the qualification to 
express an opinion, not simply on the fact of expression itself. 
!d. at 1114 (emphasis in original). 
Whether the author of the report has sufficient expertise to render the opinion expressed 
in the report is clearly an issue of admissibility to be decided by the judge, not, as some 
courts have ruled, an issue of credibility to be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Walker v. 
Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 654 (D. Nev. 1982) ("the issue of qualifications of the 
investigators goes more to the weight and credibility of the evidence than its admissibility"). 
138. See supra note 13. 
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expertise by requiring the party opposing the admission of the 
report to show that the expert was not qualified to render the 
opinion stated in the report. 139 Although on an individual level 
this may be appropriate, there are whole categories of officials 
whose opinions should not be admissible whether provided as live 
testimony or in a public record. 
The test here should be whether the authors of the report would 
have been allowed to give their opinions if they had heard all of 
the information that they used to form their opinions through 
listening to witnesses at the actual trial. Take, for example, the 
report of a government doctor, who after examining a party's 
medical records writes a report indicating an opinion that the party 
is permanently disabled. If the doctor had attended the trial and 
listened to live testimony concerning the party's condition, rather 
than examining the party's medical records, the doctor would be 
allowed to testify as to an opinion of whether the party was 
permanently disabled. Therefore, under this standard, assuming 
that the other conditions of Rule 803(8)(C) are met, the doctor's 
opinion given in the written report would also be admissible. 
The result should be different, however, if the author of the 
report had not been a medical doctor, but instead a worker's 
compensation hearing officer, who, after conducting a hearing at 
which expert medical testimony was presented, had authored a 
report stating the conclusion that a party was permanently disabled. 
The report should not be admissible because a worker's compen-
sation hearing officer would not be deemed qualified to give that 
opinion live at trial after having heard that same testimony while 
sitting through the trial. If not qualified to give an opinion live 
based on testimony presented at the trial, the officer's written 
opinion, which is less reliable because not subject to cross-exami-
nation and not based on evidence heard by the jury, should 
certainly not be admitted. Although the hearing examiner is an 
expert of sorts, this expertise is not as a medical doctor, but in 
worker's compensation law and fact finding. At the worker's 
compensation hearing, the officer must weigh the medical testi-
mony, applying the law to those facts, and reach a conclusion. At 
the trial, however, this is the jury's function. 
139. The Melville court, 443 F. Supp. at 1114, accepted the proposition that the author 
of the report must have sufficient expertise to have rendered the opinion if called as an 
expert at trial, see supra note 137. The court, however, required the party opposing 
admission to mount a "specific challenge" to the expertise of the reporter. Melville, 443 
F. Supp. at 1114; see also United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1355 
(6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1980) (in which the court would not accept 
a "bald assertion" that a hearing examiner was not an expert); supra note 22. 
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This is not to say that all conclusions reached by nonexpert 
hearing examiners should be excluded. Rather, their admission 
should not be based on Rule 803(8)(C), but on either the statutory 
requirements or policy behind the act that created them initially. 
For example, some federal courts in Title VII employment discrim-
ination lawsuits admit, under Rule 803, the conclusions of Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") investigators and 
hearing examiners regarding whether there is reasonable cause to 
believe that discrimination took place. 140 It is clear, however, that 
under the standard set out above, these conclusions should not be 
admissible under the rule. If a person normally employed as an 
EEOC hearing examiner were to sit through a Title VII trial and 
be asked on the stand for an opinion as to whether discrimination 
had taken place, that person would most likely not be allowed to 
give it. Why then, should that opinion be considered more reliable 
and admissible under Rule 803 if the person heard the same 
testimony, not at the trial, but at an earlier hearing? 
Those opinions admitting EEOC findings rely on two Supreme 
Court cases, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 141 and Chandler v. 
Roudebush. 142 In Alexander the Court rejected an employer's ar-
gument that a labor arbitration finding of no discrimination pre-
cluded an employee's Title VII lawsuit, holding that "the federal 
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy 
against discriminatory employment practices can best be accom-
modated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy 
under the grievance-arbitration · clause of a collective-bargaining 
agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." 143 Although 
the arbitration decision would not bar the employee's suit, the 
Court indicated, without explanation, that it "may be admitted as 
evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropri-
ate."144 
This dictum in Alexander can best be explained not as an 
evidentiary ruling, but as part of the "accommodation" the Court 
was trying to reach between two federal substantive policies. The 
140. McLure v. Mexia Indep. School Dist., 750 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1985); Plummer v. 
Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 
F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978); Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Mo. 
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985). But 
see Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972). 
141. 415 u.s. 36 (1974). 
142. 425 u.s. 840 (1976). 
143. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60. 
144. /d. at 60. 
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employee argued that the negative arbitration decision should have 
no effect on the Title VII suit, while the employer asserted that it 
should completely bar suit on a res judicata basis. The Court 
compromised by giving some, but not preclusive effect to the 
decision. The decision is admissible not because of any special 
reliability, but to give some effect to the arbitration and thereby 
further ''the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor dis-
putes . . . . '' 145 
The issue became more clouded two years later with Chandler 
v. Roudebush, 146 which involved the Title VII claim of a federal 
employee. Federal employees are required to pursue an adminis-
trative complaint with the Civil Service Commission before bringing 
a Title VII lawsuit. In Chandler, the government defendant claimed 
that a finding of no discrimination by the commission should bar 
the employee's Title VII lawsuit. The Supreme Court held that 
such a finding should not bar the suit, but again compromised by 
noting in a footnote that "[p]rior administrative findings made 
with respect to an employment discrimination claim may, of course, 
be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo. See 
Fed.Rule Evid. 803(8)(C). Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co . ... " 147 In spite of the passing reference to Rule 803(8)(C), 
Chandler should be viewed, not as an evidentiary decision, but as 
a substantive Title VII decision attempting to reach an accom-
modation between Congress's requiring an administrative proceed-
ing and Congress's allowing a trial de novo. 148 
The opinions allowing admission of EEOC administrative find-
ings are not wrong, but they should be based on an interpretation 
of congressional intent concerning the Title VII process and not 
on Rule 803(8)(C). In deciding whether to admit the conclusions 
of a hearing examiner or arbitrator in similar situations, the court 
should proceed as follows: If the hearing officer would not have 
been permitted to give an opinion in person as an expert, the 
145. !d. at 59. 
146. 425 u.s. 840 (1976). 
147. !d. at 863 n.39 (citing FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21). 
148. The courts are apparently laboring under some confusion regarding whether EEOC 
findings should be admitted on the basis of Rule 803(8)(C) or as part of the Title VII 
statutory scheme. There is a split of authority regarding whether the findings are per se 
admissible in Title VII cases, Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 
1978); Smith v. Universal Servs., 454 F.2d 154, 156-58 (5th Cir. 1972), or whether they 
should be admitted or excluded based on the trial judge's discretion, Johnson v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 969 U.S. 1041 (1984); Walton 
v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1977). Those courts taking the per se result 
cannot, or at least, should not rely on Rule 803(8)(C), which grants the judge discretion 
to deny admission of the report if found untrustworthy. 
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officer's written opinion should not be admitted under Rule 
803(8)(C). In such cases, however, the court should examine the 
cause of action to determine whether there is either an explicit 
legislative directive or a strong policy reason for giving the admin-
istrative conclusions some evidentiary weight at trial. 
An example of a fact finding that would be admissible under 
this approach is one that comes from the medical malpractice 
panels in several states. These findings are often determined to be 
admissible by the statutes creating the panels. 149 Even if the ad-
missibility of these findings were not mandated by statute, courts 
should generally admit them because of the primary policy reasons 
behind the creation of the panels, that is, to encourage settlement 
and to avoid the necessity of trying medical malpractice cases. 150 
Knowledge by both parties that the finding can be introduced at 
trial encourages settlement. 
D. Source of Expert Opinion 
If an investigator's opinion or conclusion is not based on per-
sonal knowledge, it should not automatically be admissible, even 
if the investigator would qualify as an expert. An opinion presented 
in an investigative report, like an expert's opinion presented live 
at trial, must be based on facts or data "reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the particular field. " 151 The advisory committee's 
note to Rule 703 explicitly states that ''The language would not 
warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an 'accidentologist' 
as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on 
statements of bystanders. '.' 152 Yet in Baker v. Elcona Homes, 153 
149. See, e.g., Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN., § 3-2a-06 (1989); N.Y. Juo. LAw 
§ 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). · 
ISO. Treyball v. Clark, 65 N.Y.2d 589, 590-91, 483 N.E.2d 1136, 1137, 493 N.Y.S.2d 
1004, 1005 (1985); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 288-89, 385 A.2d 57, 66, 
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570 P.2d 
744, 751 (1977). 
151. FED. R. EVID. 703. See supra note 128 for the full text of Rule 703. 
152. FED. R. Evm. 703 advisory committee's note: 
If . . . enlargement of permissible data may tend to break down the rules of 
exclusion unduly, notice should be taken that the rule requires that the facts or 
data "be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." 
The language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an "ac-
cidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on 
statements of bystanders, since this requirement is not satisfied. 
The clear import of this statement is that the advisory committee believed that an expert 
determining the cause of a particular accident would not reasonably rely on statements of 
bystanders. This conclusion seems questionable. Whether it is reasonable for an expert to 
rely on bystander statements is a factual matter that may vary from case to case based on 
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cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Beech Aircrajt, 154 
the Sixth Circuit did virtually that by admitting a police sergeant's 
accident report which was based in part on the statements of one 
of the parties. 155 Most courts, however, have refused to admit 
accident reports based on hearsay statements. 156 
As noted earlier, the advisory committee's note to 803(8)(C) lists 
as a factor to be considered the ''possible motivation problems 
suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman." 157 If this refers to the moti-
vation of the witnesses whom the investigator interviewed, in 
addition to the motivation of the investigator himself, it is a step 
in the right direction. 158 An expert's opinion based extensively on 
the hearsay statements of interested witnesses should be excluded 
as untrustworthy .159 
such matters as the reliability of the witnesses, the extent of corroborating physical evidence, 
and other factors. 
It is critical that before admitting the live expert testimony under Rule 703, the court 
must determine that the expert's reliance on the source of information was reasonable. The 
court should also determine this before admitting an opinion under Rule 803(8)(C). 
153. 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). 
154. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 446 (1988). It is unclear whether 
the Court is approving only the holding that, under Rule 803(8)(C), "factual findings" 
encompass opinions and conclusions, or the specific application of that holding in Baker 
as well. 
155. Baker, 588 F.2d at 555-56 (admissible on the ground that the report was a public 
record). 
156. See Miller v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 697 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1983); Dallas & Mavis 
Forwarding Co., v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1981); Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
157. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note (citation omitted). 
158. In Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), the Court did not explicitly refer to 
the motivation of either the railroad company that prepared the report or the engineer 
whose statement it contained. The actual holding of Palmer is that the report did not 
satisfy the requirement of the Business Records Act, ch. 640 § I, 49 Stat. 1561 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982)) (the precursor to Rule 803(6)), that it must be 
prepared in the regular course of business, because its "primary utility is in litigating, not 
in railroading." Palmer, 318 U.S. at 114. Subsequently, most courts and commentators 
have agreed, however, that the Court was concerned about the motivation to lie which was 
present both as to the company and the engineer that made the report untrustworthy. 
See,e.g., Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1975); McCORMICK, supra note 1, at 
877. 
In examining the police report for trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(C), the Baker court 
looked only to the "possible motivational problems" of the police officer who prepared 
the report. Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978). To be faithful 
to the advisory committee's four factors and to Palmer, the court should also have examined 
the motives of the witness who gave the information to the officer. That witness was 
clearly an interested party, and his "motivational problems" should have been considered 
in determining whether the report's conclusion was trustworthy. 
159. See Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1981) 
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The standard, however, should be more explicit. If the expert 
would not be allowed to give an opinion at trial due to its reliance 
on improper or insufficient data, the opinion in the report should 
also not be admitted. If, on the other hand, the author of the 
report has based conclusions on the type of information normally 
relied on by experts in his field, the report should not be inad-
missible merely because that information contained inadmissible 
hearsay .160 Some courts have gone further by intimating that no 
conclusions based on hearsay evidence would be considered trust-
worthy, and all such reports would be inadmissible. 161 As previously 
noted, this probably goes too far, because a reading of Rule 
803(8)(C) in conjunction with 803(8){B) indicates that at least some 
findings based on hearsay sources would be admissible under 
subsection C. 162 
E. Hearsay Statements Contained Within the Report 
A related problem is whether the hearsay statements of witnesses 
upon which the investigator based conclusions may also be admit-
ted if included in a properly admitted report. Such statements may 
constitute "hearsay within hearsay" and thus can only be admitted 
if each part conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. 163 
They are not made admissible merely because they are enshrined 
in a government report. 164 
On the other hand, if such statements are admitted along with 
the investigator's findings, they are not really hearsay at all, as 
(court found a police accident report "derived primarily from the story of a biased 
eyewitness" inadmissible under Rule 803(8)(C) because of "possible motivational prob-
lems."). 
160. This comports with one of the seven additional criteria developed by Judge Becker 
in Zenith Radio: "(7) Where the public report purports to offer expert opinion, the extent 
to which the facts or data upon which the opinion is based are of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 
505 F. Supp. 1125, 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re 
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
161. See supra note·78. 
162. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
163. See FED. R. Evro. 805 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under 
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an e~ception to 
the hearsay rule provided in these rules."). 
164. Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (following Colvin v. United 
States, 479 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
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they are offered to show the basis for the investigator's opinion 
and not for the truth of the matter asserted. 165 · 
It is again reasonable to adopt the approach taken by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence for dealing with the admissibility of the basis 
of an expert's opinion. Unfortunately, Rule 705, which addresses 
this problem, does not specifically state whether the proponent of 
an expert's opinion may automatically introduce the facts and data 
upon which the expert relied. 166 It does, however, give the opposing 
party the right to require such disclosure on cross-examination. 167 
The rule also states that the expert may testify "without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data .... " 168 This, of course, 
leaves open whether the expert may disclose the underlying facts 
or data when those sources are inadmissible hearsay. 
Most courts and commentators adopt the reasoning above and 
allow such disclosure, but merely to explain the basis of the expert's 
testimony .169 It seems reasonable to treat hearsay statements con-
tained in an investigative report in the same manner. They should 
165. See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (lith Cir. 1984). The court 
stated: 
Fowler also claims that the district court erred in admitting affidavits that the 
EEOC collected during its field investigations. The appellant acknowledges that 
the actual report and findings of the commission's field. investigation are admis-
sible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), which excepts from the hearsay exclusion the 
results of federal investigation, but he contends that the affidavits that support 
those findings do not fall within 803(8)(C) and are therefore inadmissible hearsay. 
The contention is without merit because the district court admitted the affidavits 
not as evidence of the truth of statements that they contained but only for the 
limited purpose of showing the basis for the EEOC's findings. Consequently .. the 
affidavits were not hearsay. · · 
!66. FED. R. EVID. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the 
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying 
facts or data on cross-examination."). 
167. !d. 
168. /d. (emphasis added). 
!69. SeeS. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 467 (3d. 
ed. 1982): 
The Rule [703) does not indicate whether the expert can state for the jury the 
factual basis of an opinion if the facts are of a type generally excluded from 
evidence. Rule 705 is not helpful on this point either. The best reading of Rule 
703 in our view is to read the word "otherwise" into the last sentence of the 
rule before the word "admissible." The result of this reading is that the expert 
can rely not only on facts· reasonably relied upon by experts in his field, but also 
can give a full account to the jury, which is necessary to insure that the jury has 
a basis for properly assessing the testimony. Evidence not otherwise admissible 
is not admitted under this rule for its truth; it is .admitted to explain ·the basis 
of the expert opinion. 
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be admissible, but only under the conditions set forth below. 
First, the report must contain a conclusion by the investigator. 
It must be more than a series of transcriptions of eyewitness 
reports. Second, the facts and data must be of a type reasonably 
relied upon by an expert in the field. 170 Third, the author of the 
report must actually have relied on the information in reaching 
the conclusion. 171 Fourth, the opponent should be entitled to a 
limiting instruction that the statements may not be used for the 
truth of the matter asserted. 172 Additionally, the court should 
consider a Rule 403 objection to the evidence if the danger of 
prejudice, the likelihood that the jury will consider it as substantive 
evidence, outweighs its probative value, the need to show the 
investigator's basis for the conclusion. 173 
V. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR APPLYING RULE 803(8)(C) 
A. Courts Should Scrutinize the Sources of Information upon 
Which a Public Report Is Based 
Rule 803(8)(C) differs in one significant aspect from most other 
hearsay exceptions, because the declarant in an 803(8)(C) situation 
is not a first-hand observer of the event in question. The exceptions 
are grounded on the premise that the circumstances help to insure 
the truthfulness and accuracy-reliability-of the observer or de-
clarant, so that cross-examination is not necessary. 174 Under Rule 
803(8)(C), however, the author of the report, the declarant, will 
often not have been a first-hand observer. The declarant will have 
to rely on observers and other sources of information to make a 
factual finding. Nothing inherent in the rule guarantees the relia-
bility of the original observers, thus precluding the need for cross-
examination. This is one reason that the rule allows exclusion if 
"the sources of information or other circumstances indicate [a] 
lack of trustworthiness." 175 Too many courts, however, fail to 
examine thoroughly the "sources of information," concentrating 
170. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
171. O'Malley v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 776 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Bobb v. Modern Prods., 648 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). 
172. S. SALTZBERO & K. REDDEN, supra note 169, at 467. 
173. /d. 
174. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(1). Present sense impressions require a "statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the 
event or condition, or immediately thereafter." The requirement that the statement must 
be contemporaneous helps to insure both accuracy, because there is no problem with 
memory, and truthfulness, because there is no time to make up a falsehood. 
175. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C). 
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instead on the "circumstances" of the investigation. 176 This is not 
surprising, as all four of the trustworthiness factors mentioned in 
the advisory committee note are based mainly on the reliability of 
the reporter and the circumstances of the report, rather than the 
sources of information. 177 The assumption behind concentrating on 
the reporter and the circumstances of the report is that the gov-
ernmental fact finders will have judged the reliability of the 
observers on whose observations they relied to reach their findings. 
The wording of the rule, however, clearly indicates that the court 
must also examine the trustworthiness of the sources of information 
and not rely entirely on the governmental reporter for this deter-
mination. Although reliance on some hearsay should not render 
the report automatically inadmissible, 178 courts should exercise 
caution before admitting reports when the fact finder has relied, 
in significant measure, on hearsay evidence in reaching the findings. 
If an important hearsay source might have been biased or was in 
some other way unreliable, the court should consider excluding 
the report, even if the government fact finder found the source 
sufficiently reliable to base its conclusions upon. 179 
B. Courts Should Set a Reasonable Burden of Proof for the 
Party Opposing the Admission of the Report 
Most courts have held that if a government report fulfills the 
basic requirements of Rule 803(8)(C), the report is assumed to be 
trustworthy and admissible. The burden has been placed on the 
party opposing admission to show a lack of trustworthiness. 180 The 
176. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
177. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note. Only the fourth factor, 
"possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman," if interpreted broadly 
to include the motivation of the original observer as well as the reporter, goes to the 
trustworthiness of the source of information. !d.; see supra note 158 and accompanying 
text. 
178. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
179. This is similar to the second of the seven additional criteria for trustworthiness 
fashioned by Judge Becker in Zenith Radio: 
The extent to which the agency findings are based upon or are the product of 
proceedings pervaded by receipt of substantial amounts of material which would 
not be admissible in evidence (e.g., hearsay, confidential communications, ex 
parte evidence), and the extent to which such material is supplied by persons 
with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1980), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
180. See supra note 22. 
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standard for this burden, however, should not be a preponderance 
of the evidence. This standard is impossibly difficult, especially 
where direct access to the governmental fact finder has not been 
possible. Rather, the report should be excluded if there is any 
significant doubt regarding its trustworthiness, when the fact finder 
is absent and unavailable for cross-examination. For example, if 
the fact finder is in any way aligned with a party, or has any 
reason to be biased against a party, the court should seriously 
consider excluding the report without requiring the opposing party 
to actually demonstrate bias. 181 Also, in order for parties to meet 
their burden of exclusion, they must be given access to the author 
of the report during discovery .182 One commentator has suggested 
that Rule 803(8)(C) should be treated as the residual exception, 
Rule 803(24), requiring that the party proposing admission submit 
a copy of the report to the court and opposing counsel before 
trial. 183 Moreover, when a court believes that sufficient doubts are 
raised about the trustworthiness of a report, this should warrant 
its total exclusion from jury consideration rather than allowing the 
jury to weigh its credibility, as some courts have stated. 184 This 
181. In Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1047 (lOth Cir. 1986), a civil rights suit 
against the police for excessive use of force, the court refused to exclude the results of an 
internal investigation by the police themselves that cleared the officer in question, because 
the plaintiff had not provided "specific evidence" of bias. See also In re Agent Orange 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (that government is defendant 
does not render government report untrustworthy), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 926, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987). 
182. See Fayson v. Shannon & Luchs, No. 88-0144 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 1988) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Dist. file) (allowing "deposition subpoenas to interrogate any person who 
contributed to the preparation and presentation of the factual recitations stated in the 
report"); State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799, 801, 803-05 (N.D. 1982) (requiring proponent 
of factual findings to give opponent a copy of public report well in advance of offer in 
evidence, and allowing cross-examination of source and reporter, under state equivalent of 
Rule 803(8)(C)). 
183. Note, The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative Reports Under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(8)(C), 96 HARV. L. REv. 492, 507 n.82 (1982). The author would also 
require the party proposing admission to "include with this submission a statement indicating 
the source of the report, the qualifications of the individual or agency responsible for the 
report, the reasons that the report is needed .... Both the party opposing admission and 
the court will then be in a position to examine the report for possible bias." I d. 
184. In Wolf ex. ref. Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 625 (D.N.J. 
1982) the court stated, "Defendants assert that the research for the studies was hastily 
conducted and suffered from serious methodological flaws. However, these considerations 
bear on the weight to be given the evidence by the jury rather than its admissibility." See 
also Perrin, 784 F.2d at 1047 (any bias by the investigator "should affect the weight given 
the report, not its admissibility"); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 
1339, 1355 (6th Cir. 1978) (factors suggesting incompleteness of fact finding perhaps "affect 
the weight given to the findings, but not their admissibility."). 
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result is not only mandated by Rules 803(8)(C) and 104(a), 185 but 
it also makes sense. Without hearing cross-examination of the 
reporters and their sources, the jury cannot adequately weigh the 
credibility of a questionable report. 186 
C. Courts Should Examine Evidence Potentially Admissible 
Under Rule 803(8)(C) .in Light of Rule 403 
Rule 403 requires the court to exclude relevant evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence." 187 Government reports should be 
examined carefully under Rule 403 because of their tendency to 
run afoul of many of the Rule 403 · dangers, especially unfair 
prejudice. 
Some courts have recognized the potential for unfair prejudice, 
because the· jury may overestimate the probative value of official 
government reports. Juries might believe that there is "an aura of 
special reliability and trustworthiness" to the report because it is 
prepared by a government official. 188 This may be especially true 
when it is the report of a federal agency which "bears the impri-
matur of the United States Government. " 189 
The potential for unfair prejudice increases not only with the 
status of the agency issuing the report, 190 but also with the formality 
185. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the 
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)." FED. R. EVID. 104(a). The exception 
of subdivision (b) involves "[r]elevancy conditioned on fact" and does not apply to whether 
a given set of facts fits a hearsay exception, a question that should be decided exclusively 
by the judge. See, e.g., Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs: An Essay in Honor of David 
Louise/1, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 987 (1978) (discussing issues involved in the distribution of 
functions between the judge and jury as to preliminary questions of fact). 
186. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
187. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
188. City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1164 (1982); see also Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 23 
(6th Cir. 1984); Fowler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 92 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Miss. 1980); 
Zenith Radio. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1160-61 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). 
189. In re Multi-Piece Rims Prods. Liab. Litig., 545 F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.O. Mo. 
1982). 
190. Several courts have recognized the extra potential for the jury to attach undue 
weight to official reports of Congress. Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d at 
23; Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, 653 F. Supp. 810, 816 (D.D.C. 1987). 
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of the circumstances under which it was prepared. The jury is less 
likely to attach undue weight to a police officer's on-the-scene 
accident report than they are to the findings of a hearing officer 
after a full evidentiary hearing. In the latter case, the jury may 
be tempted to think that an expert, having heard all the evidence, 
probably reached the correct conclusion and might feel pressured 
to affirm the expert's conclusion. 191 The danger of unfair prejudice 
is particularly high when the facts found by the hearing officer 
are exactly the facts that are to be determined by the jury. 
In addition to the problem of undue prejudice, several courts 
have also recognized that Rule 803(8)(C) reports can be excluded 
under Rule 403 because of "considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 192 One 
court held that admission of a government report would have 
protracted ''an already prolonged trial with an inquiry into col-
lateral issues regarding the accuracy of the report and the methods 
used in its compilation.'' 193 Not only does a dispute concerning 
the accuracy of an official report take time, it also tends to focus 
the jury's attention on whether the facts were correctly found in 
the government report, rather than on the factual issues in the 
case. 194 Another potential "waste of time" is the process of sifting 
through long government reports to separate the admissible from 
inadmissible sections. 195 
Rule 403 requires that the previously mentioned dangers of the 
evidence be balanced against its "probative value." In many cases, 
the probative value of a governmental report will vary with its 
trustworthiness: the greater the reliability, the greater the probative 
191. One court declined to admit an EEOC determination of discrimination, stating 
that consideration of the determination was "tantamount to saying 'this has already been 
decided and here is the decision.'" Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori School, 776 F.2d 150, 
154 (7th Cir. 1985). See also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
192. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
193. City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1164 (1982); see also John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 
636 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 367 
(D.D.C. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1145-
46, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1029 (1987). 
194. United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1103 (1983); Pullman, 662 F.2d at 915; Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social 
Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 591 (D.S.C. 1983); American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. at 
368. 
195. John McShain, Inc., 563 F.2d at 636 (probative value of National Transportation 
Safety Board report outweighed by waste of time in sifting out admissible hearsay). 
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value. Therefore, many of the same considerations that the courts 
used in determining the trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(C) will 
also shape their determination of probative value under Rule 403. 
However, probative value is not synonymous with trustworthi-
ness or reliability. Probative value is also a measure of how 
important and helpful the evidence is to the trier of fact when 
considering all of the evidence available. When the government 
report is based on an on-the-scene investigation, or a study that 
would be impossible to replicate for the jury, the evidence is more 
important to the trier of fact and more probative. 196 On the other 
hand, if the report is nothing more than the conclusions of a 
government official who has heard testimony virtually identical to 
that of the jury, then the report does not have a particularly high 
probative value. 197 
The most dangerous governmental reports, in terms of Rule 403, 
are findings of fact and conclusions issued by hearing examiners. 198 
Although they may not be untrustworthy, these findings are not 
particularly probative, in that they are merely the conclusions of 
another fact finder who has heard the same testimony as the jury 
(while often not in any better position than the jury to make such 
conclusions). This is especially true where the case involves disputed 
testimony, and the findings of the hearing officer involve a deter-
mination of the credibility of the witnesses. Such determinations 
are not only unhelpful to the jury, but they invade its responsibility. 
They are fraught with the danger of unfair prejudice in that the 
jury might hesitate to "overrule" the findings of the previous 
tribunal. Such reports should generally not be admitted unless 
196. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v. 
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (the court admitted epidemio-
logical studies conducted by the CDC that established a statistical relationship between 
tampons and toxic shock. The studies involved hundreds of women and could not have 
been replicated for the jury. The findings and conclusions based on the study were valuable 
in that they made use of evidence which otherwise would not have been available to the 
jury.). 
197. See Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 23 (6th Cir. 1984), 
excluding congressional report under Rule 403 because, among other reasons, many of the 
conclusions, "could really be argued on the basis of what's already in evidence and on 
reasonable inferences that might be drawn from those facts that are in evidence." See also 
Note, supra 10, at 164-65. By analogy to the rule on expert testimony, Rule 702, such 
evidence would not be admissible because it would not "assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. Evm. 702. 
198. This is especially true when the finding issued by the hearing officer coincides with 
an issue of fact concerning the parties before the court that must be decided in the case 
at hand. It is less bothersome if the finding involves an issue that is only collateral to the 
issue at trial. 
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required by statute, or unless a strong substantive policy exists for 
admitting the finding. 199 
The most unfair situation results where the report is based on 
an ex parte or nonadversarial hearing, and the party opposing the 
report did not have the opportunity to participate fully in the 
earlier hearing. This creates the greatest danger that the jury may 
overestimate the reliability and trustworthiness of the governmental 
report. How can it be helpful for the jury, which is presented with 
both sides of the evidence including cross-examination, to hear the 
hearing examiner's conclusion based on a much less full or fair 
hearing? The jury can better reach its conclusion on the same 
issue, and the earlier, perhaps flawed, determination adds nothing 
of value to its determination. Therefore courts should virtually 
never admit the findings of hearing officers if those findings were 
issued after a hearing at which the party opposing admission of 
the findings did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses, unless this result is required by the statute under which 
the hearing was held. 
Several courts, recognizing the potential prejudice in the admis-
sion of government reports, have approved the use of cautionary 
jury instructions. This clarifies that the findings contained in 
governmental reports are to be treated like other evidence and are 
not binding on the jury. 200 Although this is a step in the right 
direction, it is no substitute for exclusion in cases in which the 
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of the report. 
D. Courts Should Allow the Party Opposing Admission To 
Examine Government Reporters As If They Were Under Cross-
Examination 
This Article has explained the unfairness that can result when 
the report of a government investigation is admitted into evidence 
without affording the party against whom the report is offered a 
chance to cross-examine the author of the report. This unfairness 
may be partially mitigated if the party opposing the report is 
allowed to call the reporter as a witness. 
Rule 806 states that "[w]hen a hearsay statement ... has been 
admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be 
199. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
200. In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. 
denied, 456 U.~. 971, cert granted sub nom. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 456 
U.S. 971 (1982), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 
534 F. Supp. 509, 512 n.3 (W.O. Mo. 1982); In re Multi-Piece Rims Prods. Liab. Litig., 
545 F. Supp. 149, 153 n.3 (W.O. Mo. 1982). 
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attacked . . " 201 Further, the rule specifically allows such a cred-
ibility attack by cross-examination: "If the party against whom a 
hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a 
witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as 
if under cross-examination. " 202 Because in a Rule 803(8) situation 
the author of the report is the declarant, the author should clearly 
be subject to cross-examination if called by the opposing party. 
Although Rule 806 addresses only what will happen if the 
declarant is called by the opposing party and not whether the 
opposing party has the right to call the declarant, the clear impli-
cation of the rule is that the opposing party should be allowed to 
do so.203 There is no good reason to treat a public official any 
differently from any other witness with knowledge of relevant 
matters. 204 
As a matter of trial strategy, it may be a difficult decision for 
the party against whom the report has been offered to decide 
whether to call the author of the report for cross-examination. On 
the one hand, such cross-examination may be the best method of 
exposing flaws in an investigation that may have led to an invalid 
conclusion. On the other hand, this strategy must be balanced 
with the risk that calling the author of the report will increase the 
importance of the report in the eyes of the jury. 
201. FED. R. Evm. 806. 
202. /d. 
203. See Note, supra note 183, at 507 n.79 ("Litigants can impeach a report by either 
attacking the report's logic or calling the officials who made the report as witness."). 
This issue has arisen in one case, although not as to trial, but in whether the opposing 
party had the right to issue subpoenas for discovery depositions to the authors of government 
reports. The court in Fayson v. Shannon & Luchs, No. 88-0144 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 1988) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), refused a request to quash subpoenas issued for 
Housing & Urban Development investigators, holding that the party opposing the admission 
of their reports had the right to take their depositions on the issue of their credibility. 
204. There is, however, a contrary argument to this position. Although not mentioned 
as one of the reasons for Rule 803(8) in the advisory committee's notes, one possible 
reason for the exception "is to reflect a concern that the time of public officials should 
not be unduly wasted, since this could be disruptive of the agency involved." J. FRIEDENTHAL 
& M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 127 (1985). Allowing the opposing party to call the 
public official would obviously interfere with this desire to protect the official from having 
to testify. 
The simple answer to this argument is that Rule 803(8) is a hearsay exception, not a rule 
of privilege. As all hearsay exceptions, it merely exempts the party wishing to admit the 
hearsay statement from having to call the witness to the stand. It should not be used as a 
rule of privilege to shield a witness with knowledge of relevant facts from having to testify 
to those facts. 
Weinstein takes an intermediate position, giving the trial judge the discretion "to insist 
upon the official being produced for examination as to his experience and training if he is 
available. Cf. Rule 614(a)." J. WEINSTEIN, supra note I, at 250. 
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E. Congress Should Amend Rule 803(8)(C) by Including It As 
a Rule 804 "Declarant Unavailable, Exception 
Hearsay exceptions under the Federal Rules are divided into two 
groups. The 803 exceptions apply "even though the declarant is 
available as a witness. " 205 The 804 exceptions apply, however, only 
"if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. " 206 According to 
McCormick: 
The theory of the first group is that the out-of-court statement is at 
least as reliable as would be his testimony in person, so that producing 
him would involve pointless delay and inconvenience. The theory of the 
second group is that, while it would be preferable to have live testimony, 
if the declarant is unavailable, the out-of-court statement will be ac-
cepted.207 
This Article has described numerous reasons why, in many 
circumstances, the fact finding report of a government official is 
not "at least as reliable as would be his testimony in person. " 208 
Because cross-examination of the fact finder is often crucial, it 
would be more reasonable to change Rule 803(8)(C) to a Rule 804 
exception, requiring production of the fact finder unless unavail-
able. 
It has been argued that one of the reasons for the adoption of 
Rule 803 was "to reflect a concern that the time of public officials 
should not be unduly wasted, since this would be disruptive of the 
agency involved.' ' 209 Requiring appearance of the official would 
obviously interfere with this concern. Authors of most reports 
admitted under Rule 803(8)(C), however, are not upper level policy-
making employees whose temporary absence would be severely 
detrimental to an agency, but rather lower level employees such 
as police officers, investigators, and hearing examiners. The cost 
of requiring such officials to testify must be balanced against the 
unfairness and prejudice that results when their reports are ad-
mitted without their testimony. That balance should favor their 
testimony if they are available. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), as recently interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, provides a hearsay exception for reports 
205. FED. R. Evm. 803. 
206. /d. 
207. See McCoRMICK, supra note I, at 753. 
208. For example, cross-examination of the official would be helpful in determining 
whether he had the necessary expertise to reach the conclusions that he did, whether the 
procedures followed in the investigation were fair and reasonable, and whether the sources 
relied upon were trustworthy. 
209. J. FRIEDENTHAL & M. SINGER, supra note 204, at 127. 
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resulting from investigations by public officials, including the 
conclusions and opinions of the investigator. Because the report 
may be admitted without cross-examination of either the official 
who prepared it or by the witnesses the official may have inter-
viewed as part of the investigation, this rule creates a great danger 
of presenting unfairly prejudicial evidence to the jury. Although 
the rule contains an escape clause denying admission where the 
report is not trustworthy, this has not always been carefully and 
consistently applied by the courts. 
This Article suggests the following, which will help to insure 
that prejudicial evidence is not admitted under the rule. First, the 
rule should be read in conjunction with the expert opinion rules, 
treating the government reporter as an expert witness. The reporter 
must have the requisite expertise to render any opinions contained 
in the report. Also, if the reporter relied on any hearsay evidence 
in reaching conclusions, it must be the kind of evidence reasonably 
relied on by experts in that particular field. Additionally, courts 
should perform a more careful analysis of Rule 803(8)(C) evidence 
under Rule 403 to determine whether its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly where police 
accident reports and findings of hearing examiners are issued 
without a full hearing at which all parties were represented and 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. These reports 
should generally not be admitted by the courts. 
